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ABSTRACT 
Historically, labour dispute resolution in South Africa has been synonymous with being 
expensive, unnecessarily lengthy and ineffective. The Labour Relations Act (LRA) 66 of 
1995 set out to change this through the creation of the Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA). The design of the CCMA is centred on a dispute 
resolution institution that adopts a quick, cheap and non-legalistic approach to dispute 
resolution. Through the introduction of compulsory arbitration for specified dismissal and 
unfair labour practice disputes, the LRA granted the CCMA the mandate of upholding the 
objectives of industrial peace and reducing exorbitant legal costs. The outcome of arbitration 
proceedings conducted under the auspices of the CCMA are final and binding. Accordingly, 
this sui generis type of proceedings aimed at being cheap and informal has several 
implications. The adherence to traditional legal principles, in particular the rules relating to 
the presentation and admissibility of evidence cannot be adhered to rigorously in a forum 
where parties are unrepresented and that has informality as a defining feature. This paper set 
out to examine the proposition that based on various statutory powers; arbitrations are to be 
conducted informally and free from legalism- which necessarily entails a relaxation if not 
elimination of the traditional exclusionary rules pertaining to the presentation and admission 
of evidence. 
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Labour disputes anse from the relationship between employers and employees, or the 
termination thereof. South African labour law provides an extensive range of statutory 
employment rights and thus an extensive range of rights disputes. The Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act 1sets minimum conditions of employment, the Employment Equity Act2 
prohibits discrimination against employees on certain grounds, except on certain specified 
grounds, and obliges the employer to implement affirmative action measures to achieve 
equitable demographic representation in the workplace, the Labour Relations Act3 confers, 
inter alia, the right against unfair dismissal and unfair labour practices and the right to 
collectively bargain. The contract of employment between an employer and employee still 
remains a fundamental source of rights and thus labour disputes include breaches of contract 
claims.4 
The advent of the 1995 Labour Relations Act5 ('the LRA') brought about significant change 
to dispute resolution in South Africa. A specialist high court, namely the Labour Court and a 
Labour Appeal Court was created. Most significantly a primary objective of the LRA is to 
provide an inexpensive, non-legalistic and quick method of resolving specified employment 
disputes through conciliation and arbitration. 
The preamble to the Act reads as follows: 
"To provide simple procedures for the resolution of labour disputes through statutory 
conciliation, mediation and arbitration (for which purpose the Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration is established), and through independent alternative dispute 
resolution services accredited for that purpose." 
1 Act 75 of 1997. Hereinafter referred to as the BCEA. 
2Act 55 of 1998. Hereinafter referred to as the EEA. 
3Act 66of1995. 
"section 74 of the BCEA. 
5Act 66of1995. 
1 
In accordance with the stated objective, the Commission for the Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration ('the CCMA') was created in terms of section 112 of the LRA. It occupies 
offices, and has jurisdiction, in all nine provinces.6 
Section 115 of the LRA prescribes the functions of the CCMA. The CCMA must attempt to 
resolve, through conciliation, any dispute referred to it in terms of the LRA or other 
legislation. 7 If a dispute that has been referred to it remains unresolved after conciliation, the 
commission must arbitrate the dispute if the LRA or other legislation requires arbitration 
under the LRA and any party to the dispute has requested that the dispute be resolved through 
arbitration, or all the parties to a dispute in respect of which the Labour Court has jurisdiction 
consent to arbitration under the auspices of the Commission.8 
Accredited Bargaining Councils are accredited to perform the same dispute resolution 
functions of the CCMA in certain disputes. Where disputes are referred for conciliation and 
arbitration in terms of the LRA to these accredited Bargaining Councils, the Bargaining 
Council arbitrators have the same functions, powers, duties and review evaluation that 
CCMA commissioners have when conciliating and arbitrating disputes. 9 Accordingly, all 
references to statutory arbitrations are equally applicable to Bargain Council arbitrations as 
well. 
1.2 Purpose of the Study 
The aim of this research paper is to examine arbitrations conducted in terms of the LRA by 
the CCMA and relevant Bargaining Councils. The proposition is that, based on the specific 
statutory powers, particularly section 138, the test for review of arbitration awards, the 
objects of the LRA and intention of the Legislature when they created statutory arbitration, 
arbitrations should be conducted in a simple informal non-legalistic manner without 
adherence to strict rules of evidence relevant to traditional court proceedings. 
6 Section 114(1) LRA 
7 Sectionl15(l)(a). 
8 Sectionl15(l)(b)(i) and (ii). 
9See section 51, 127 and 128 of the LRA. 
2 
The resolution of disputes inevitably involves the presentation of evidence by the parties to 
the arbitrator, especially where there are disputes of fact. In labour law, how evidence is 
presented and its admissibility depends on the nature of the proceedings, namely whether 
they are internal disciplinary proceedings, statutory arbitrations, private arbitrations or 
Labour Court proceedings. 
The primary aim is to examine the presentation and admissibility of evidence in statutory 
arbitration hearings, that is arbitrations conducted in terms of the LRA. The proposition is 
that based on section 138 of the LRA, disputes are to be determined informally, quickly and 





Generally, arbitration is a process where a neutral third-party makes a decision on a specified 
range of disputed issues and at the end of the case issues a written arbitration award (like a 
writtenjudgment). 10Statutory arbitrations are arbitrations conducted under the auspices of the 
CCMA or relevant Bargaining Councils. Importantly they are conducted in terms of the LRA 
which, through various provisions of the Act and Rules of Proceedings of the CCMA drafted 
in terms of the Act, regulate the conduct of these proceedings. Private arbitrations, on the 
other hand, are conducted in terms of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965. This paper is concerned 
with statutory arbitrations conducted in terms of the LRA. 
2.2 Jurisdiction of the CCMA and Bargaining Councils 
The matters that the CCMA and Bargaining Councils must arbitrate are set out in the LRA 
and related legislation. The CCMA and bargaining councils have jurisdiction to arbitrate, 
inter alia, disputes concerning dismissal for misconduct and incapacity, 11 constructive 
dismissals, a retrenchment dispute where the process involved only one employee, 12 
13 " · 1 b . 14 . • 1 . h 15 d h . . d severance pay, un1air a our practices, orgamzat10na ng ts an t e mterpretat10n an 
application of settlement and collective agreements. 16 Parties may also consent to the 
jurisdiction of the CCMA in respect of certain disputes ordinarily adjudicated by the Labour 
Court. 
10 Arbitration has characteristics rese111bling adjudication but is more accurately classified as a quasi-judicial 
process. Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO (1998) 19ILJ1425 (LAC) 
"Section 191 of the LR.A .. 
12Section 191 of the LR.A. 
"Section 41 of the BCEA. 
14Section 191 of the LR.A. 
15Section 22 of the LR.A. 
16Section 24 of the LR_A. 
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2.3 Representation in the CCMA and Bargaining Councils 
Parties to a dispute in an arbitration have a right to representation. To this effect section 
138(4) of the LRA provides that a party may be represented by a legal practitioner, a director 
or employee of the party or any member, office-bearer or official of the party's registered 
trade union or registered employers' organisation. 17 
Generally lawyers are not allowed to represent parties where the dispute concerns a dismissal. 
This is probably due to the fact that lawyers will make the process legalistic and expensive 
which would undermine the object of expeditious arbitration. It is further added that the use 
of lawyers in arbitrations would 'tilt the balance unfairly in favour of employers' as 
employers are in a better position to absorb the associated legal costs. 18 Legal representation 
is only permissible in these circumstances where consent of all parties as well as leave of the 
commissioner is obtained. Even if a party objects to the other being represented by a legal 
practitioner, commissioners are empowered to permit such representation if he feels the 
situation warrants such representation. This is permissible in terms of CCMA Rule 25(l)(c) 
where a commissioner concludes it would be unreasonable for a party to deal with the dispute 
without legal representation following a consideration of the legal nature of the dispute, its 
complexity, the public interest and the comparative ability of the opposing parties to deal 
with the dispute. 
Where parties fail to agree on representation, it is expected that commissioners will apply 
their minds before denying or permitting legal representation. 19 It has been held by the labour 
court that the pivotal question to be determined by commissioners is if it would be 
unreasonable to allow a party to continue without legal representation.20 
In the recent judgment of Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and 
Others v Law Society of the Northern Provinces21 the constitutionality of Rule 25(l)(c) of the 
CCMA was in dispute. The High Court per Tuchten J declared the rule to be unconstitutional 
on the basis that it was irrational as it limited a litigant's right to legal representation.22 The 
17
Rule 25. Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings Before the CCMA Published under GN Rl448 in GG 25515 
of I 0 October 2003 
18 D Collier "The Right to Legal Representation Under the LRA,. (2003) 24 JLJ 753. 753. 
19
] Grogan Workplace Law 10'" Ed (2009) 429. 
20
Aji·ox Ltd 1· Laka & others (1999) 20 JLJ 1732 (LC) 1737. 
21 (005/13) [2013] ZASCA 118 
"Law Society of the Northern Prm·inces v Minister of Labour and Others (2013) I BLLR 105 (GNP) 45. 
5 
Supreme Court of Appeal per Malan J, in vanance with the learned judge came to the 
conclusion that the rule served a legitimate governmental purpose and held that with regard to 
binding established authority- there was no general right to legal representation in 
administrative tribunals.23 The full bench concmTed on this position and accordingly the SCA 
has provided some clarity on the right to representation in the CCMA. 
r 
_ _, Con1nzission for Conciliation, )Vf ediarion and Arbitration and Others v La1v Society oj'the 1Vorthern Provinces 
(note 21above)26. The full bench concurring. 
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CHAPTER3 
THE CONDUCT OF ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS IN TERMS OF THE 
LABOUR RELATIONS ACT 66 OF 1995 
3. l Introduction 
An arbitrator as the presiding officer fulfils a role similar to that of a judge or magistrate. He 
or she will hear the oral evidence and argument, assess real and documentary evidence and 
make a decision in the form of an arbitration award.24The issue that is examined in this 
chapter is how arbitrators are permitted and required by the LRA to conduct arbitrations. The 
proposition that is explored is that, while the process of arbitration is similar to litigation, the 
intention of the legislature was to provide an alternative to seeking redress through traditional 
court structures and that statutory arbitrators are not expected to act in the same manner as if 
it were legal proceedings in a court.25 The role and powers awarded to arbitrators by the LRA 
indicate that they are permitted, and in certain situations actually enjoined, to conduct 
arbitrations in a more inquisitorial, investigative and robust manner in order to resolve the 
dispute in a manner that is simple and quick, but fair. They are also enjoined to apply rules of 
evidence that are not as technical or strict as those used in courts. 
3.2 The Format of Arbitration Proceedings 
This subject necessarily involves an examination of the traditional and inquisitorial 
approaches to fact-finding hearings. 
3.2.1 The Traditional or Adversarial Trial Process 
The basic system of adjudicating legal disputes through our courts in South Africa is called 
the adversarial system. In broad terms an adversarial system has the following features: The 
parties or their representatives define and control the issues to be determined and the flow of 
evidence. 
26 
They are responsible for selecting and leading witnesses and other evidence 
which advance their case. The right to cross-examine is seen as a fundamental procedural 
24
Bellengere A .... et al The LaHi oj'Eridence in South Africa: Basic Principles: Procedural Laiv (2013) 424 
25
Naraindath v CCMA & others (2000) 21ILJ1151(LC)26-27. · 
'6 - Bellengere ... et al (note 24 above) 424. 
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right. The role of the presiding officer is limited; he or she may not inquire beyond the 
evidence and issues put forward by the parties, may not cross examine witnesses and may 
only intervene to apply rules of evidence. 27 These rules mostly operate to exclude certain 
types of evidence on the basis that they are irrelevant, inherently unreliable, prejudicial, 
obtained unlawfully or contrary to public policy. The assumption is that the most effective 
way of determining a dispute fairly is to allow the parties to put their respective cases in their 
own way and control the evidence. 28The court will thus only hear evidence that the parties 
have presented and not any other, possibly valuable and useful, evidence.29 
3.2.2 The Inquisitorial Approach 
Broadly speaking, in an inquisitorial or investigative system the presiding officer takes a 
more interventionist position. He or she plays an active role in determining and testing the 
issues and facts of the dispute during the hearing through personal questioning of the 
disputants and witnesses. He or she may thus inquire and go beyond the issues and evidence 
offered by the parties. The questioning and cross examination of witnesses is at the discretion 
of the presiding officer and the rules regarding admissibility of evidence are less strict.30 
An inquisitorial approach permits the presiding officer to determine the flow of evidence by 
playing an active, investigative role through questioning parties and eliciting evidence. 31 It is 
essentially an inquiry to establish the material truth, with the inquirer using evidence as an aid 
to achieve this end. 32 
27PJ Schwikkard, Principles ofEvidence, 3'' Ed (2009) 9. 
28 B Whitcher ''Speedy and effective arbitration in the CCMA: a case for an inquisitorial approach" Research 
Paper (2013). 
'9 · Bellengere ... et al (note 24 above) 424. 
'° B Whitcher (note 28 above) 
11 Bellengere ... et al (note 24 above) 424. 
32PJ Schwikkard (note 27 above) 10. 
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3.2.3 Inquisitorial Systems in the South African Legal Svstem 
Inquisitorial features have long since been introduced into our legal system in important areas 
outside of labour law. JJ They were intended to meet the challenge posed by a variety of 
disputes that require simple, quick and cheaper processes. J4 Examples include the Small 
Claims Court, the Land Claims Court, the Admiralty Court and the Competition Tribunal.JS 
The proceedings before the Small Claims Court are informal in nature and conducted in a 
manner determined by the commissioner subject to the overriding need to comply with the 
principles of natural justice. 36 In terms of the Small Claims Court Act 37 the presiding 
commissioner shall proceed inquisitorially to ascertain the relevant facts. Parties have the 
responsibility for indicating what witnesses they wish to give evidence in support of their 
claim but the responsibility for questioning witnesses lay with the presiding commissioner. 
Parties may only question witnesses with the consent of the presiding commissioner. 
Evidence to prove or disprove any fact in issue may be submitted in writing or orally. The 
rules of evidence do not apply and the presiding officer may ascertain any relevant fact in 
such manner as it may deem fit. The Competition Tribunal, which enjoys considerable 
powers of remedy, including the prohibition of mergers, the imposition of injunctive relief, 
the levying of administrative penalties and the ordering of divestiture, also has similar 
inquisitorial powers and procedures.JS 
3.2.4 Inquisitorial Systems in other Labour Jurisdictions 
In Australia and the United Kingdom, which have labour adjudication systems similar to 
ours, inquisitorial style approaches are common in administrative and labour tribunals. In the 
UK, arbitration under the auspices of ACAS is a voluntary alternative to proceedings in the 
Employment Tribunal. In tem1s of the rules arbitrations are informal with the arbitrator 
deciding all procedural and evidential matters during the hearing. The rules of evidence 
which apply in the courts will not apply in the arbitration hearing. Both parties are given a 
33 B Whitcher (note 28 above) 
"Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36Naraindath v CCMA & othe!'.5 (note 15 above) 32. 
37Act 61 of 1984. 
38B Whitcher (note 28 above) 
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full opportunity to outline their arguments, to refer to any relevant documents submitted by 
themselves or the other party, and to call those they wish to speak on their behalf. 
Usually one person presents each party's case, but other members of each party's team may 
be asked to give supporting statements and be questioned by the arbitrator. The arbitrator will 
adopt a questioning approach to the hearing and, although there will be no direct cross-
examination, a party may suggest questions which the arbitrator might put to the other party. 
The arbitrator will also be able to assist any party who is having difficulties in fully 
explaining their case. Each party will be allowed to summarize the main points of their case 
they wish to be considered by the arbitrator in comjng to a decision. 39 
3.3 Determining the Format of Arbitrations Conducted Under the LRA 
3 .3 .1 Introduction 
An arbitrator's general powers and the general procedures regarding the conduct of 
arbitration proceedings under the LRA are set out in section 138 of the Act which reads as 
follows: 
(1) The commissioner may conduct an arbitration in a manner that the commissioner considers 
appropriate in order to determine the dispute fairly and quickly and must deal with the 
substantial merits of the dispute with the minimum of legal formalities. 
(2) Subject to the commissioner's discretion as to the appropriate form of the proceedings, a 
party to a dispute is entitled to give evidence, call witnesses, question the witnesses of any 
other party, and address concluding arguments to the commissioner. 
The interpretation of s 138 and thus how an arbitrator may conduct the proceedings must be 
seen in light of the Legislature's knowledge of the flaws synonymous with the adversarial 
system 40 and the overall purpose of the 1995 LRA in providing for arbitration by the CCMA 
39P Benjamin 'Friend or Foe? The impact of Judicial Decisions on the Operation of the CCMA' (2007) 28 JLJ 
20; B Whitcher (note 28 above). 
"
0Pep Stores (Pty) Ltd v Laka (1999) BLLR 952 (LC) 19. 
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and the establishment of the CCMA. When the draft of the 1995 LRA was published it was 
accompanied by an explanatory memorandum.41 The following extracts are pertinent: 
"Our system of adjudicating unfair dismissal disputes is, contrary to original intentions, 
highly legalistic and expensive. The Industrial Court conducts its proceedings in a formal 
manner, along the lines of a court of law, and adopts a strictly adversarial approach to the 
hearing of cases. Judgments are lengthy, fairness is determined by reference to established 
legal principles and, within an essentially adversarial system, the lawyer's presentation of a 
case has inevitably emphasized legal precedent. Legalism undermines the goals of the system, 
namely cheapness, speed, accessibility and informality. Common law perceptions of natural 
justice, rather than industrial relations-based equity, have become the standard by which 
fairness is assessed. "42 
The next portion of the memorandum43deals with the draft bill's solution to this problem. The 
old system is starkly contrasted with the new system in the following passage:44 
"In cases concerning the alleged misconduct of workers, the courts have generally required an 
employer to follow an elaborate pre-dismissal procedure and have thereafter conducted a 
fresh, full hearing into the merits of the case. Apart from its duplication and lengthiness, this 
approach has obvious cost implications for the parties and the State. The draft bill requires a 
fair, but brief, pre-dismissal procedure, and quick arbitration on the merits of the case." 
The memorandum goes on 45 to say the following: 
"By providing for the determination of dismissal disputes by final and binding arbitration, the 
draft Bill adopts a simple, quick, cheap and non-legalistic approach to adjudication of unfair 
dismissal. .. In order for this alternative process to be credible and legitimate and to achieve 
the purposes of the legislation, it must be cheap, accessible, quick and informal. These are. the 
characteristics of arbitration, whose benefits over court adjudication have been shown in a 
number of international studies." 
41 Labour Relations Act 66of1995, Explanatory Memorandum ( 1995) 16 ILJ 268-336; Narainda1h v CCMA & 
others (note 25 above) 22. ,, 
- LRi\ Explanatory Memorandum (note 41 above) 316. 
4' 'LRA Explanatory Memorandum (note 41 above) 317. 
44Naraindath v CC.MA & others (note '.'5 above) 23. 
45 LRA Explanatory Memorandum (note 41 above) 318. 
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The underlying policy considerations should remam the yard-stick in analysing the 
consequences ofs 138 of the LRA. The CCMA and ultimately s 138 symbolise the need for a 
dispute resolution mechanism that is efficient and responsive in nature. The discretion 
incumbent in s 138 allowing commissioner's autonomy in the choice of format of 
proceedings must be seen as a retort to the former Industrial Court trials, which were 
essentially adversarial and lengthy. 
3.3.2 The General Conduct of Arbitration Proceedings 
The rules of natural justice and fairness should always serve as a guide to arbitrators in the 
conduct of proceedings. Arbitrators may not allow the ignorance of a lay litigant to favour the 
other party unfairly. They are required to take charge of the proceedings when parties are 
unrepresented and do not realise what is expected of them. When appropriate, arbitrators 
should in an even-handed manner assist lay representatives to present and put their version to 
opposing witnesses. They should also warn them of the consequences of not leading evidence 
on particular issues or of not putting their version to the other parties' witness where the 
evidence of the witness contradicts, modifies or otherwise has an impact on their version.46 
The inquisitorial power of the arbitrator is further established by the following comments of 
the Constitutional Court in CUSA v Tao Ying Metal Industries & others:47 
"The LRA introduces a simple, quick, cheap and informal approach to the adjudication of 
disputes" 48 
" ... commissioners are required to deal with the substantial merits of the dispute with the 
minimum of legal formalities. This requires commissioners to deal with the substance of a 
dispute between the parties. They must cut through all the claims and counter-claims and 
reach for the real dispute between the parties. In order to perform this task effectively, 
arbitrators must be allowed a significant measure of latitude in the performance of their 
functions. Thus the LRA permits commissioners to 'conduct the arbitration in a manner that 
the commissioner considers appropriate. But in doing so, commissioners must be guided by 
at least three considerations. The first is that they must resolve the real dispute between the 
parties. Second, the must do so expeditiously. And, in resolving the dispute, they must act 
fairly to all the parties'"" 
Commissioners should not lightly tell parties what they should complain about. However 
the commissioner must raise material issues and points of law which were not raised by the 
46 Bellengere et al (note 24 above) 425. 
47(2009) I BLLR I (CC). 
48 (Ibid) 63. 
49 
CUSA v Tao Ying Metal Industries (note 47 above) 64-65. 
12 
parties, but which are apparent in the dispute and necessary to the proper determination of 
the dispute"50 
Section 138 thus establishes a broad mandate as to how comm1ss10ners are to conduct 
proceedings. The wide discretion conferred on commissioners can be said to encompass the 
LRA's objectives of a system of dispute resolution aimed at being 'simple, quick, cheap and 
non-legalistic'. 51 
The case of Deutsch v Pinto & another52 quite accurately sums up the nature of CCMA 
arbitrations as follows: 
"The CCkfA is not established as a court of law. When arbitrating it follows the rules of 
natural justice as embodied in the LRA. It arrives at its decisions and makes its awards in a 
judicial manner. "53 
It is apparent that arbitrators are not required to act in the same manner as a presiding officer 
would in a court. 54The Labour Appeal Court has held that an arbitrator may ascertain any 
relevant fact in any manner it deems fit on condition that it is fair to the parties.55 The rules of 
natural justice as expressed by the Latin maxims: audi alteram partem (both sides must be 
heard) and nemo iudex in propria causa (no one may judge his own cause) must be 
observed. 56 Arbitrators are expected to conduct arbitration proceedings in a fair, impartial 
manner that is free of any conduct that may cause a party to form a reasonable apprehension 
of bias. 
A general duty incumbent on arbitrators in line with the principle of fairness is to ensure that 
parties are aware of their rights and the powers of the arbitrator as well as the procedure to be 
followed. This responsibility is pertinent where the parties to dispute are unrepresented. 
so CTJS,4 \'Tao Ying j\;felal Jndustrir!s {note 47 above) 68. 
51 P Benjamin. (note 39 above) 2. 
52 (1997) 18 ILJ 1008 LC 
53 Ibid. 1012. 
54
D Du Toit ... et al. The Labour Relations Act: A Comprehensive Guide S" Ed (2006). 
"Le Monde Luggage CC v Commissioner Dunn & others (2007) 10 BLLR 909 (LAC) 17-19. 
'°J Brand Labour Dispute Resolution 2 Ed (2008) 204. 
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The LC in Bafokeng Rasimone Platinum Mine v CCNJA & Others57 succinctly states that the 
duty to assist litigants is ultimately dependent on compliance withs 138: 
'At the end ol the day, rhe cardinal question is whether the merits of the dispute have been 
adequately dealt with andfi1irly so in compliance with the provisions ols 138 ol the Labour 
Relations Act . . ss 
The nature of s 138 establishes a positive obligation on arbitrators to intervene actively in 
proceedings if it is required to deal with the substantial merits of the dispute. This obligation 
must be observed irrespective of the procedure used in proceedings. 
Commissioners are effectively mandated under s 138 to adopt any method they see fit, on 
condition it is fair. Where the circumstances so require, commissioners should adopt methods 
beyond traditional inquisitorial and adversarial approaches in order to effectively carry out 
this mandate. 
3.3.3 The Rules of Evidence 
The CCMA Guidelines state that parties are entitled to exercise the rights to present different 
types of evidence, call and question witnesses and address arguments to a commissioner 
regardless of the form of proceedings. 59 It follows that the decided format of proceedings will 
influence the manner in which parties exercise these rights. 
Wallis AJ in Naraindath v CC!V!A and Others60 suggested that arbitrators should only adopt 
the traditional adversarial approach where the true issue depends on the resolution of a clear 
dispute of fact which can only be determined by listening to evidence and determining the 
credibility of witnesses. 
In its most recent judgment on the scope of review of arbitration proceedings in Gold Fields 
Mining SA (Pty) Ltd (KloofGold Mine) v CCMA & others61 the LAC emphasized that the test 
is whether the process that the arbitrator employed gave the parties a full opportunity to have 
57 (2006) 27 ILJ 1499 (LC) 
58 Ibid. 17. 
59 CCMA Guidelines: Misconduct Arbitrations 2011. 15. 
00 (note 25 above) 
61 Unreported, 5 November 2013. 
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their say in respect of the dispute; not whether they were given full adversarial procedures, 
such as the right to cross examine and control the flow of evidence. 
Magistrates and judges have to comply with peremptory rules and principles of evidence in 
civil and criminal courts. 62 In contrast to this, section 138 denotes the great discretion 
arbitrators have in applying the rules of evidence. 
While it is not possible to lay down specific guidelines for commissioners as to the exact 
manner in which they are to conduct proceedings, the CCMA Practice and Procedure Manual 
2011 (hereinafter referred to as the Manual) offers some assistance. The Manual suggests 
several factors to be considered when deciding on the form of the arbit~ation. 63 These 
include; 
• the complexity of the factual and legal matters involved; 
• the attitude of the parties to the form of the proceedings; 
• whether the parties are represented; 
• whether legal representation has been permitted and 
• the experience of the parties or their representatives in appearing at arbitrations. 
Each case will be judged on its own merits and the circumstances will dictate the manner in 
which evidence is adduced. With fairness as the superseding principle, an arbitrator has to 
determine a dispute quickly and with the minimum of legal formalities whilst ensuring parties 
rights are upheld. The duties encompass cautioning parties of the consequences of: changing 
their version of events; putting forward new versions; failing to lead evidence on a particular 
issue or of not putting their version to the opposition's witness where the evidence of the 
witness contradicts or otherwise impacts their version.64 
It is obvious that the primary reason for arbitrator's to assume an active role in proceedings is 
to ensure fairness through the assistance of lay litigants. Deciding when and how often to 
intervene presents a challenge. This is a delicate procedure as an arbitrator has a continuing 
duty to guide and assist parties, whilst trying to elicit relevant information in order to deal 
621 Brand (note 56 above) 205. 
63CCMA Practice and Procedure Manual 6'' Ed. November 2011. 12.4. 
64
Klaasen v CCMA and others (2005) 26ILJ1447 (LC); Dimbaza Foundries v CCMA and others (1999) 20 JU 
1763 (LC); Consolidated Wire Induslries (Ply) Lid v CCMA and others (1999) 20 [LJ 2602 (LC); Sikula Sonke v 
CCMA and others (2007) 28ILJ1322 (LC) 
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with the substantial merits of the dispute. Where it is apparent that unrepresented litigants are 
tentative to proceedings, arbitrators are expected to actively direct proceedings thereby 
preventing the ignorance ofa lay litigant favouring the other party unfairly. 65 
Active intervention on the part of a commissioner in guiding or assisting a party has the 
potential to create an apprehension ofbias.66Arbitrators should not intervene in proceedings 
at liberty. Rather, it can be inferred from the salient points in s 138 that an arbitrator should 
only intervene to the extent that the dictates of fairness warrant such intervention or where it 
is necessary to ascertain and deal with the substantial merits of the dispute. 67 
3 .4 Conclusion 
Arbitrators are therefore required to conduct an arbitration in a manner he or she deems 
appropriate to the particular case and disputants, including in an inquisitorial style, especially 
where parties are unrepresented or do not have skills to properly lead evidence and question 
witnesses. The duties entail narrowing the dispute and determining relevant issues and 
disputes of fact. Parties to the dispute are to be guided by the arbitrator as to what evidence to 
lead even if these facts are beyond what the parties have decided to present. The rules of 
evidence that are to be applied must not be as technical or strict as that used in courts.68 
Benjamin quite accurately locates the role of the arbitrator as that of a 'helping hand' 
discharging the obligation to reach the substantial merits of the dispute. 69 Having regard to 
the objectives of the CCMA, it is submitted that an arbitrator's obligation under s 138 cannot 
effectively be carried out through restrictions inherent in the law of evidence as applied in 
courts. There must inevitably be a relaxation of the rules of evidence in arbitrations paired 
with the discretion to conduct proceedings as an arbitrator deems fit. It is also important to 
bear in mind that the strict system of evidence as incorporated in courts is a 'concomitant of 
the adversarial model of fact-finding'. 70 
65 Ibid. 
66Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd v CO.JA & Others (1997) 12 BLLR 1610 (LC) 
67Du Toit ... et al. (note 54 above) 127 
68Le 1\lfonde luggage CC v Con1n1issioner Dunn & others (note 55 above). 
69P Benjamin P (note 39 above) 15. 
70P J Schwikkard (note 27 above) 9. 
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An arbitrator must embark on a nuanced weighing of several factors so as to ensure the result 
is fair, quick and parties are able to exercise their rights whilst avoiding strict legalism in the 
process. The arbitrator must not be perceived to be advancing one parties at the expense of 
the other and should be cautious to explain the procedures where a course of action may be 
open to suspicion. 
It is submitted that an arbitrator cannot successfully achieve the mandate enumerated by s 
138 of the LRA whilst circumventing strict legalism, without having formidable experience 
and knowledge of the legal procedures to start with. Of import is the fact that there exists no 
burden on an arbitrator to conduct proceedings in a manner resembling that of a court oflaw. 
However, in order to depart from established legal procedures and still aim to achieve a result 
free of irregularities requires the making of coherent and informed decisions. This can only 
be achieved through a sound understanding of the law of procedure, and in particular the 
workings of the law of evidence in this unique niche of labour disputes conducted at 
arbitration in terms of the Labour Relations Act 66of1995. 
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CHAPTER4 
WHAT IS EVIDENCE 
This analysis that follows evaluates what evidence is in terms of South African Law. The key 
focus here will be on established principles relating to evidence in terms of civil law. 
4.1 Background and Pumose of the Law of Evidence 
Parties to a dispute must present material called evidence in order to prove or disprove a case. 
However, evidence is more than simply the material provided to establish a fact. The law of 
evidence also regulates the process of proving. facts. It serves to govern on a factual basis 
what rights, duties and liabilities exist.71 
Evidence is defined as: 
"Any thing or statement that might prove the truth of the fact at issue. Evidence is that which 
demonstrates, makes clear. or proves the truth of the fact at issue. ••72 
The case of Tregea v Godart73he1d that the law of evidence is that portion of the law by 
means of which facts are proven. 
What becomes clear from the concept of evidence is that it is used as a tool to achieve a 
certain purpose. It in essence is an instrument that is used to prove or disprove some factual 
assertion that is in dispute. It is by adducing evidence that a party is able to prove an asserted 
fact or disprove a fact asserted by another party. The law of evidence therefore serves the 
purpose of proving or disproving an issue in dispute by prescribing what material may be 
adduced as evidence as well as the manner in which it is to be presented and by whom. The 
role played by evidence in the process of any dispute is accordingly of paramount 
importance. 
The law of evidence forms part of that of branch of law called adjective law and is the 
procedural mechanism that allows for substantive rights and duties to be exercised. Adjective 
law does not only provide for substantive rights and duties, it gives rise to its own rights and 
duties which include for example the right of a pai1y to cross-examine a witness. 74The South 
71 PJ Schwikkard (note 27 above) 1. 
''.MS Sheppard The Wolters Kluwer Bouvier law Dictionmy Compact Ed (2011) 396. 
7
' 1939AD 16 
74PJ Schwikkard (note 27 above) 32. 
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African Law of evidence belongs to the Anglo-American system of evidence which is based 
upon adversarial principles and a strict system of evidence. 75 
It was held in Tregea v Godart76 that substantive law prescribes what has to be proved and by 
whom, while the rules of evidence relate to the manner of its proof. 
The law of evidence is integral as it comprises the procedural machinery that enforces and 
gives effect to substantive law. The objective of the system of evidence is an attempt to 
uncover and protect the truth. 
It is easier to understand the concept of evidence in terms of the function which it plays. The 
primary function of the law of evidence is to provide for the determination of facts admissible 
to proving facts in issue, it further determines the method of adducing evidence, the rules for 
weighing the cogency of the evidence and the burden of proof to be discharged before a party 
to litigation can succeed. 77 It significantly also lays down the rules applicable to the 
presentation of different types of evidence. 
Evidence determines the facts admissible for proving facts in issue. Facts that are in issue are 
those facts which need to be proven to establish a case, these are known as facta probanda. 
Facts which are relevant to the facts in issue are facts which prove or counter those which are 
in issue and are known as facta probantia. A golden rule of evidence is that a fact cannot be 
relied on unless it has been proved through a witness or document or it has been agreed to by 
the other side. 78 
Facts in dispute will be determined according to substantive law and those that are relevant to 
the facts in issue will be determined by the procedural law of evidence. 
Generally speaking, evidence consists of oral statements made during proceedings under 
oath, affirmat.ion or warning. Evidence also includes documentary evidence and objects 
produced and received during proceedings through witnesses. All evidence is presented 
through a relevant witness as objects and documents do not speak and cannot be cross-
examined to test the authenticity and veracity thereof. 79 
75DT Zeffert The South African Law of E1·idence (2003) 35. 
76 1939 AD 16 
77CRM Dlamini ProofBeyond a Reasonable Doubt (LLD thesis. University of Zululand .. 1998) 423- 424. n . 
I Brand (note 56 above) 206. 
79PJ Schwikkard (note 27 above) 18. 
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One of the major functions of the law of evidence is to ascertain what facts will be legally 
acceptable in order to prove or disprove a disputed point of fact. The role played by the law 
of evidence is pivotal as it provides a guideline for presiding officers in assessing what 
evidence is admissible, the cogency thereof and what weight to ascribe to items of evidence 
in terms of the overall jigsaw of evidence. It further assists in the determination of which 
party bears the onus of proof and on what standard this burden is to be discharged. The 
concepts of proof, relevance, admissibility and weight will be discussed in the chapters that 
follow. 
Closely linked to evidence is the concept of probative material. The notion of probative 
material embraces more than simply evidence produced and received in court. 80 Probative 
material is material that will help determine the facts of the case. It includes facts that do not 
have to be proved and those that have to be proved by means of evidence. Schwikkard and 
Van der Merwe81 submit that the term "probative material" is a convenient term to include 
not only oral, documentary and real evidence but also formal admissions, judicial notice and 
presumptions. The concept of probative material therefore encompasses more than just oral, 
documentary and real evidence. 
4.2 Evidence and Proof 
Proof has been defined as: 
'"The evidence that demons/rates the truth or falsity of a claim. Proof is a demonstration of 
the truth or falsity of some argument or claim, based upon evidence and argument. Proof is 
the test of an asserted Jae! or legal claim that leads an observer, such as a judge, to believe 
the assertion or clain'I is rrue or fQ/se, or at least believe that the assertion oj.claiTTz is true or 
false to some level of confidence in that belief····'' 
Evidence is not automatically deemed as proof. Evidence of a fact is only proof of that fact 
once a court has accepted it as such. This can only be done after evaluation by the court and 
so In the case of S 1· A1joli 1981 3 SA 1233 (A) it was stated that admissions made by an accused in terms of 
section 115 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 though not strictly evidence, can be regarded by the 
presiding officer as probative material in the fact-finding process. 
81PJ Schwikkard (note 27 above) 19. 
8• ·Ms Sheppard (note 72 above) 875. 
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after it is satisfied that such fact has been proved. 83 There are various factors which have a 
bearing on the proof of a fact. These include which party bears the burden of proof and on 
what standard that party is to discharge that burden of proof. 
A common tenn that one may encounter when discussing proof is that of prima facie proof 
which implies that proof to the contrary is still a possibility. 84 With conclusive proof 
however, the proof is deemed to be final and no rebuttal can be proffered. Schwikkard asserts 
that the term prima jacie proof is often used incorrectly as a synonym for prima ji:1cie 
.d 85 ev1 ence. 
Emphasis must be placed on the fact that proof must be based on evidence. Where a party 
does not adduce sufficient evidence to prove an issue in dispute, it is likely that a presiding 
officer will find that they have failed to convincingly discharge the burden of proof 
incumbent upon them. 
4.3 Evidence in Labour Law 
Labour law falls under that branch oflaw known as private law which is part of civil law. As 
discussed earlier, labour disputes also have to be settled by a process of proving certain 
disputed facts. In order to prove a case in a court trial, arbitration case or a disciplinary 
inquiry, a party relies on various forms of evidence. This evidence may take the form of real 
evidence (eg. physical objects), documentary evidence (eg. affidavits) and oral evidence (eg. 
witness testimony). 
The learned Pillay J in the case of Public Servants Association obo Haschke v MEC for 
86 Agriculture & others commented on the nature oflabour law: 
.. Labour law is not administrative law. They may share many common characteristics. 
However, administrative lmrfa!ls exclusively in the category of public law. whereas labour 
law has elements of administrative law, procedural law. private law and commercial law. "87 
It is necessary to consider the mies and laws applicable to labour disputes in order to 
establish their bearing on evidence in labour disputes. Labour law and employment law in 
::n . ·pJ Schw1kkard (note 27 above) 19. 
"Ibid. 20. 
85Ibid. 
86 2004 (8) BLLR (LC) 
87Ibid. 1 I. 
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South Africa comprises a complex set of rules which originate from the common law and 
statute. 88Fmiher, the Minister of Labour is empowered in terms of various labour statutes to 
issue 'codes of good practice'. These codes provide guidelines but in effect have quasi-
statutory force as the CCMA and courts are to have regard to them in the process of resolving 
d. 89 1sputes. 
In the case of Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration 90 it was held that decisions made by commissioners in the CCMA constitute 
administrative action in terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 91 and are 
reviewable as such. This necessarily demands that decisions by Commissioners are to be 
procedurally fair, reasonable and lawful. 
In accordance with the above, labour proceedings can be deemed sui generis proceedings in 
the sense !bat it does not fall squarely into a particular niche or branch of law. The legal 
proceedings of labour law are largely governed by statute. The normal rules of evidence as 
applicable in criminal and civil proceedings will be shown to not be strictly applicable in the 
proceedings oflabour matters and in particular statutory arbitrations. 
The manner in which evidence is presented and admitted is largely influenced by the 
respective area of law and the nature of the forum, namely whether it is an arbitration or a 
court hearing. This is significant as it impacts on the onus of proof, standard of proof as well 
as the strictness of the rules of evidence applied. This process of proof of facts in labour law 
is also regulated by the law of evidence, albeit with certain qualifications as will be shown in 
this paper. 
SS J Grogan (note 19 above) 1. 
89Ibid. 11. 
90 2007 (1) SA 576 (SCA) 
91 Act3 of2000 (PAJA) 
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CHAPTERS 
FORMS OF EVIDENCE AND THE PRESENTATION THEREOF 
5 .1 Introduction 
One of the fundamental rules of evidence is that a party will not be able to rely on a fact 
unless there is consensus between the parties on that fact or if it has been proved through a 
witness or document. 92 S 138 of the LRA provides that parties to the dispute may give 
evidence, call witnesses, question the witnesses of the other party and may further address 
concluding arguments to the commissioner. This evidence may be in the form of oral 
evidence, real evidence and documentary evidence. Each form will be discussed in tum with 
their necessary requirements for presentation. 
5 .2 Oral Evidence 
Oral evidence generally comprises oral statements proffered by witnesses in the presence of 
the parties about the facts of the case. The rationale behind the practice of oral evidence is to 
present the parties with an opportunity to confront witnesses who are testifying against them. 
It further provides an opportunity to challenge the evidence led by the witness, allowing the 
arbitrator to observe the candour of witnesses.93 The demeanour and responses of witnesses 
assist the arbitrator in making an assessment of the credibility of the witness. 
Witnesses in arbitration hearings should be sworn in, or make an affirmation that they will 
tell the truth before they testify. The affirmation will generally be used where the witness 
either has an objection to taking the oath or does not find it binding on their conscience. 
The CCMA Practice and Procedure Manual states verbatim how arbitrators should administer 
both the oath and affirmation. The oath should be administered as follows: "Do you have any 
objection to taking the oath?" If the witness answers in the negative, the arbitrator should ask: 
"Do you consider the oath to be binding on your conscience?" If the response is in the 
affirmative, the oath should be administered as follows: "Do you swear that the evidence you 
9' · J Brand (note 56 above) 206. 
93PJ Schwikkard (note 27 above) 362. 
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will give shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? Please say, so help me 
God".94 
The affirmation should be administered in the following manner: "Do you affirm that the 
evidence you will give shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? Please 
say, I do so affirm". 95 
The process that follows begins with the witness making a statement, thereafter the opposing 
party will cross-examine the witness and then the party who ealled the witness may re-
examine the witness. The witness will then make a statement which is called the evidenee-in 
chief. Once this is completed, the opposing party has the right to cross-examine the witness 
again and the party who called the witness may re-examine the witness to clarify any points 
raised during cross-examination. 
Parties are generally prohibited from asking leading questions. Leading questions are 
couched in such a manner as to suggest the answer to the witness, or assume the existence of 
certain facts in dispute.96 In the case of Modikwa Mining Personnel Services v Commission 
for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & others the Labour Court found that the 
commissioner had committed a reviewable irregularity in terms of s 145 of the LRA through 
'almost entirely' leading the witness. 97 The learned judge was patently clear that such 
conduct was 'inappropriate and reprehensible' and that a reasonable person in the position of 
the applicant had a factual basis for drawing the inference that there was a reasonable 
h . fb" 98 appre ens10n o ms. 
94 CCMA Practice and Procedure Manual (note 63 above) 13.5.3. 
95Ibid. 13.5.4. 
96DT Zeffert (note 75 above) 738. 




5.3 Real Evidence 
Real evidence is an object which, through proper identification intrinsically becomes 
evidence.99 It is in essence, evidence that is presented at the arbitration hearing as a means of 
proof. Real evidence includes material and physical objects and in order to be admissible it 
needs to be introduced through a witness who can identify and explain it. The rule regarding 
the relevance of evidence still applies to real evidence and though the tendered evidence is 
meant to be proof a fact within itself, it must be introduced through a witness testimony and 
has to be relevant to the issues in order to be admissible. 
The efficacy and relevance of real evidence is established through a witness who explains, for 
instance, the nature of the exhibit and its properties. 100 Real evidence is not conclusive in 
proving any disputed issue and may still be rebutted by the other party. One of the purposes 
served by real evidence is to enable the arbitrator to come to conclusions on the evidence 
presented using his own senses and perception of the object. 
5.3. l Computer Generated Material 
Information that has been created by a computer or other device without human intervention 
may be treated as real evidence. 101 To this extent the Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act 25 of 2002 provides for the admissibility of computer printouts of business 
records made in the ordinary course of business against any person in civil, criminal and 
disciplinary inquiry proceedings under any law and administrative proceedings without the 
testimony of the person who made the entry. 102 Further, it adds that such records will 
constitute rebuttable proof of the facts contained therein where accompanied by a certificate 
from a manager stating that the contents therein are accurate and correct. 103 
99S v M 2002 2 SACR 41 l (SCA) 3 l. 
100pJ Schwikkard (note 27 above) 362. 
IOI 
A Bellengere ... et al (note 24 above) 427. 
102 Section 15 Electronic Communications and Transactions _A.ct 25 of2002. 
103Ibid. 
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5.4 Documentary Evidence 
Documentary evidence typically comprises an important component in terms of the evidence 
adduced at arbitration hearings. Documentary evidence includes affidavits, written 
statements, employment policies, minutes and transcripts of meetings and disciplinary 
hearings, medical certificates, letters, computer printouts of emails, photographs, videos and 
·11 c 104 camera surve1 ance iootage. 
The arbitrator should enquire into the evidentiary status of documents which are submitted 
and ascertain whether the parties have agreed to the contents of the documents and are 
satisfied that they are what they purport to be. Documents may be wholly agreed to, partially 
agreed to or totally in dispute. Wholly agreed documents indicate that parties are in 
consensus as to the form and content of the documents. Partially agreed documents include 
documents where only some elements of the document are challenged, for instance where an 
item of the contents is in issue. 105 
Where the form and contents of documents are in dispute evidence must be led through a 
person who was the author, signatory, producer or had some or other connection to the 
documents sufficient to authenticate them and their contents as being accurate. Oral evidence 
is led by a witness on the relevant documentary evidence to establish the authenticity and 
veracity of the document. 
In accordance with the best evidence rule, where a party seeks to rely on a document, the 
original document should be tendered. !06 In tenns of s 34(1) of the Civil Proceedings 
Evidence Act 25 of 1965, it is mandatory in civil proceedings to produce the original of a 
document. However, this rule cannot be strictly applied in arbitration proceedings and where 
it can be shown that the original is unobtainable or obtaining the original would cause undue 
expense and delay, a copy will be allowed. 
'
04T Cohen ... et al Trade Unions and the Law in South Africa (2009) 105. 
10'Jbid. 105. 
'
06J Brand (note 56 above) 211. 
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5.4.1 Photographs. Videos and Surveillance Camera Footage 
Photographic and video footage evidence are deemed to be documents for the purposes of 
evidence. Therefore the rules relating to the relevance and admissibility of documentary 
evidence apply untainted. Accordingly, a photograph or video footage cannot be introduced 
into evidence unless a witness testifies as to its authenticity or if the parties consent to its 
admission beforehand. 
The witness who testifies to such evidence should be the person who recorded or produced 
the item. The witness should establish through the testimony that the evidence portrays true 
representations of the objects or persons they purport to represent and that there have been no 
alterations to the photograph or video footage. 107 
The case of Moloko v Commissioner Diale & Others 108held that it is imperative that before 
video footage can be relied upon it must be authenticated, the court found that the arbitrator 
had committed an irregularity by failing to reject such video footage as it was a copy, had not 
been authenticated and was of such poor quality that it failed to establish the alleged assault. 
While there can be no hard and fast rule relating to the admission of such footage, the 
admissibility of such evidence is generally dependent on the circumstances of each case. 109 
Relevance is the primary test for the admissibility thereof and it such footage should be 
authenticated. Arbitrators must exercise caution when relying on both video footage and 
photographs as a result of the inherent risks which may arise. 
'
07T Cohen ... et al (note 104 above) 105. 
108 (2004) 25 !LJ 1067 (LC) 
109 
Aji-ox Ltd v Laka & Others (1999) 20 ILJ 1732 (LC). S v Ramgobin & Others 1986 ( 4) SA 117 (N). 
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CHAPTER6 
ONUS OF PROOF 
6.1 Introduction 
The terms 'burden of proof and ·onus of proof are used interchangeably and refer to the 
same concept, namely the legal burden that a party has of finally satisfying the presiding 
officer that they are entitled to the relief sought. 110 This is done by proving the issues in 
dispute and the factual allegations upon which these are based. 111 The onus allows us to 
determine which party bears this duty of satisfying the court. 
In South African law the issue of onus and its meaning has been dealt with in the case of 
Pillay v Krishna 112 where Davis AJA stated: 
"The only correct use of the word 'onus' is that which I believe to be its true and original 
sense, namely, the duty which is cast on the particular litigant, in order to be successfid, of 
finally satisfj;ing the Court that he is entitled to succeed on his claim, or defence, as the case 
may be ... " 
The burden of proof determines which party to a dispute must fail, if the facts necessary to 
establish a claim have not been proved. 113 A party who wishes to prove an issue in 
proceedings will bear the burden of proof. Adding impetus to the above is the fact that the 
burden of proof is often referred to as the "risk of non-persuasion" as it determines who bears 
the risk of failure if evidence on a point is lacking. 114 
The general rule is that he who alleges must prove. 115 It is likely that there may be several 
issues in a case and each pa1iy may bear a burden of proof with regard to each issue, these 
will arise in sequence once the previous one has been discharged. 116 
In civil law the burden of proof is generally apparent from the statement of claim. This is in 
line with the principle of 'he who asserts must prove'. If a party raises a special defence, this 
too will affect which party has to discharge the burden of proof. 
"
0PJ Schwikkard (note 27 above) 571. 
111T Cohen ... et al. (note 104 above) 115. 
112 1946 AD 946. 952-3. 
113PJ Schwikkard (note 27 above) 571. 
114lbid. 572. 
115 Pilla_y v Krishna (note 112 above) 951-2. 
"'Ibid. 953. 
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The case of Mabaso v Felix 117 in comparing the criminal and civil onuses stated that in terms 
of the approach followed in the criminal law, the State bears the onus of proving 
unlawfulness and that an accused can only be punished for a crime once his guilt has been 
proven. An important factor with respect to criminal matters is the constitutionally enshrined 
right to the presumption of innocence. As a consequence of the presumption of innocence as 
well as the right to silence, the State through the prosecution has a duty to discharge the 
burden of proof. In civil law however, there are elements of policy, practice and fairness 
which require a defendant to bear the onus of providing some justification for his wrongful 
conduct. 118 
A presiding officer ultimately has to make a decision as to which party is successful in the 
dispute; this is largely dependent upon whether a party has sufficiently discharged the 
relevant burden of proof. That is whether, after adducing evidence one party's version is 
more probable than the other. 
6.2 Onus of Proof in Labour Law 
The rules relating to evidence in labour law differ to that of criminal and civil law. In labour 
law, the onus of proof is primarily prescribed by statute. In arbitration proceedings, the party 
bearing the onus has a duty to satisfy the arbitrator that they are entitled to the relief sought. 
Accordingly, an arbitrator has to make a decision based on the evidence tendered by the party 
bearing the onus of proof, and if the arbitrator is unable to make a decision based on the 
evidence presented then that party must fail. 119 
Over and above proving the facts in dispute, the question of onus is significant for instance in 
misconduct dismissals where it is necessary to determine which party has the burden of 
proving whether the employee committed the alleged misconduct, whether the dismissal of 
the employee was fair and whether the procedure used to dismiss the employee was fair. This 
encompasses which party has the duty to prove that the dismissal was substantively and 
procedurally fair. 
117 1981 (3) SA 865 (A) 
118Ibid. 872 G-H. 
119 J Brand (note 56 above) 218. 
29 
The onus is also significant when the evidence on a particular point is indecisive. In this 
instancean arbitrator will have to make a finding against the party who bears the onus. 
6.2.1 Onus of proof per the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
In the years preceding the 1995 Labour Relations Act there was some uncertainty as to which 
party had to bear the onus. In te1ms of unfair labour proceedings the former stance was that 
there was no onus on a particular party and that both parties would adduce evidence after 
which the court would reach a conclusion following a conspectus of the evidence as a 
whole. 120The current LRA has brought about some clarity on the issue of onus through 
specifically prescribing which party bears the onus of proof depending on the nature of the 
dispute. 
6.2.1.1 Section 192: Onus in Dismissal Disputes 
Section 192 stipulates that the onus is on the employee to establish the existence of a 
dismissal. 121 Once this a dismissal has been established, the employer has to prove that the 
dismissal was fair. 122 
In the case of Janda v First National Bank123the court had to consider the nature of the onus 
of proof before making a finding on the application for absolution from the instance. One of 
the key points noted by the court relating to the incidence of onus is that the common-law 
position that he who asserts must prove has now been overridden by section 192 of the 
LRA.124 
It has been stated that in terms of section 192 it is only once the employee is successful in 
establishing the existence of a dismissal, that the employer is required to justify its actions by 
showing that there was a fair reason and furthermore that a fair procedure was followed. 
120AECI Paints (Pty) ltd v South Aji-ican Chemical Workers Union (1989) Arb 1.2.3. 
121 Section 192(1) LRA. 
122Section 192(2) LRA. NUSOG (Western Cape) v CCMA & another (1998) 10 BLLR 1047 (LC) 8. 
123 (2006) 27 JU 2627 (LC) 
124 
T Cohen ·onus of Proof in Automatically Unfair Dismissals- Janda v First National Bank (2006) 27 ILJ 
2627 (LC)' (2007) 28 JU 1465 
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6.2.1.2 Section 187: Onus in Automaticallv Unfair Dismissals 
Section 187 deals with automatically unfair dismissals and provides that if a dismissal falls 
within one of the listed categories found in section 187(1) and a causal link is established 
between the reason for dismissal and the circumstances of the dismissal then there is a 
rebuttable presumption of unfairness. 125 This means that if an employee is able to establish an 
automatically unfair dismissal in terms of section 187 then no justification can be put forward 
by the employer. 126 The implications of this are that the employee qualifies for certain 
privileges including the above mentioned presumption and an entitlement to double the 
ordinary compensation awarded. 127 The significance of precisely determining the onus m 
such a scenario is paramount as the implications are far reaching. 
With automatically unfair dismissals as provided for in section 187, an employee has an 
evidentiary burden to prove that the reason for the dismissal fell within one of the listed 
grounds provided for in s 187. Once this is established, the onus is on the employer to prove 
that the dismissal was fair. The employee bears no onus, but rather an evidentiary burden. 128 
Once an employee proves a connection between his dismissal and a listed ground, then the 
onus rests on the employer to show that there was no unfairness in the dismissal. 129 
6.2.2 Onus of Proof per the Emplovment Equity Act 55of1998 
In terms of the equality provision in the Bill of Rights found in the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa discrimination on any of the grounds listed therein is presumed to 
be unfair unless it is established to be fair. With respect to labour law and in terms of the test 
laid down in Harksen v Lane130once an employee is able to prove discrimination by drawing 
a link between the differentiation complained of and one of the listed grounds then the initial 
onus is said to be discharged. The Employment Equity Act gives effect to this constitutional 
provision and provides almost identically in terms of section 11 that whenever unfair 
125 
Automatically unfair dismissals may be adjudicated in the Labour Court in terms of section 191 (5)(b), 
ho\vever the relationship bet\veen section 187 and 192 are relevant for purposes of discussing the onus of proof 
in terms of the LRA. 
126 T Cohen (note 124 above) 
127 Section 194(3) provides for co1npensat!on of up to 24 months' remuneration in auto1natically unfair 
dismissals compared to that of up to 12 inonths' for an ordinary dismissal. 
128The concept of evidentiary burden \vill be discussed in the follo\ving chapter. 
129
Kroukam v SA Air/ink (Pty) Ltd (2005) 26 ILJ2153 (LAC); Janda v~ Firs/ Naliona/ Bank (2006) 27 ILJ2627 
(!'ote 123 above); Thomas v Mincom (P!JJ Ltd (2007) 10 BLLR 9993 (LC). 
"
01998 (1) 300 (CC). . 
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discrimination is alleged by an employee against an employer, the employer has the duty of 
establishing that it was fair. A bald averment of discrimination will not suffice, the employee 
must provide prima facie proof of the alleged discrimination. 131 Chizunza v MTN (Pty) Ltd132 
held that pleading mere arbitrary treatment is not sufficient to constitute unfair discrimination 
in terms of the EEA. Citing the test in Harksen v Lane NO [1998 (1) SA 300 (CC), the court 
said there must be a link between the alleged differentiating conduct and a listed ground and, 
where the discrimination on an unlisted ground is alleged, the applicant employee must prove 
the differentiation amounted to 'discrimination'. Zabala v Gold Reef City Casino 133 held that 
the applicant must first prove that she had been treated differently from other employees and 
explain the basis of the comparison. 
6.3 Duty to Begin 
The party bearing the onus of proof will generally be the party who has the duty to begin. 
This simply entails that the relevant party will have the responsibility to commence the 
leading of evidence. In terms of the High Court Rules 39(5) and (9) read together it is 
stipulated that the party bearing the burden of proof has the right to adduce evidence first. 
The Magistrates' Court Rule 29 provides that the duty to adduce evidence first is married to 
the incidence of the burden of proof in the circumstances. 
While the party who bears the onus of proof should commence the leading of evidence, an 
arbitrator may rule either mero motu or on application that the other commence 
d. 134 procee mgs. 
In the case of Sajid v The Jwna lvfa.1jid Trust135the arbitrator was of the view that the duty to 
begin was placed on the employer so as to enable the employee to deal fully with the fairness 
of his suspension and the reason there for. It is expected that arbitrators will follow the same 
principles as enunciated above with the primary focus being the hearing of evidence in a 
logical manner. 
1
" TGWU & another v Bayete Security Holdings (1999) 20 ILJ 1117 (LC) and Abbott v Bmgaining Council.for 
the Motor Industry (1999) 20 ILJ 330 (LC). 
132[2008] 10 BLLR 940 (LC). 
133 [2009] l BLLR 94 (LC). 
134A Bellengere ... et al (note 24 above) at 426. 
135(1999) 20ILJ1975 (CCMA) 1979. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE EVIDENTIARY BURDEN 
7 .1 Introduction 
It is necessary-to draw the distinction between the concepts of 'burden of proof and that of 
the 'evidentiary burden'. The onus never shifts between parties but during the course of 
proceedings there may arise the need for a party to present evidence to counter certain 
allegations of fact. The case of South Cape Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Engineering Management 
Services (Pty) Ltd1 36 in drawing the distinction between the two aforementioned concepts, 
stated that while the onus can never shift from the party upon whom it initially rested the 
evidentiary burden can shift or be transferred depending on the measure of proof furnished by 
. d . h f 137 parties unng t e course o a case. 
In the case of Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others 138 the employer based misconduct 
charges on DVD footage captured on surveillance cameras. With regard to the nature of the 
evidentiary burden in dismissal proceedings the LAC per Ndlovu JA stated as follows: 
'" ... the DVD footage evidence created a prim a facie case against the employee which shifted 
the evidentiary burden to her to demonstrate her lawfit! or innocent possession or handling of 
the tivo items in question. "139 
In Hermans and Hitachi Construction Machinery Southern Africa,140 in which the employee 
simply denied the employer's evidence at arbitration and deliberately left it unchallenged in 
cross-examination, the arbitrator accepted the employer's version of events and found that it 
had discharged the onus of proving the employee guilty of misconduct. 
1361977 3 SA 534 (A) 548. 
137Ibid. This position \Vas endorsed by the Constitutional Court in the case of li.1ohunran1 v J\rational Director of 
Public Prosecution (Law Review Projecr as Amicus Curiae) 2007 2 SACR 145 (CC) 75. . 
"
8 (2011) 32 ILJ2455 (LAC) 
''°Ibid. 44. 
140(2013) ILJ 738. 
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It is only once a party has discharged the onus of proof that the opposing party can be 
expected to adduce evidence to discharge an evidentiary burden that is upon it. 141 
7.2 Evidentiary Burdens: Emnlovment Equity Act 55 of 1998 
In tenns of s 11 of the EEA whenever unfair discrimination is alleged, the onus is on the 
employer against whom the allegation is made to prove it is not unfair. The employee has an 
evidentiary burden to prove the existence of discrimination. Once this burden is discharged, 
the onus is on the employer to adduce evidence; that is, in disputing the allegation provide 
some justification to establish that the discrimination was fair. 
7.3 Evidentiarv Burdens: Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
Another example of the shifting evidentiary burden can be found in Section 187 of the LRA. 
The court in Janda v First National Bank142in commenting on the distinction between the 
evidentiary burden and onus of proof in terms of section 187 of the LRA, stated as follows: 
"The overall onus to prove that the dismissal is not automatically unfair and is for a fair 
reason lies with the employer at all times, once the employee has established that the 
dismissal has occurred. Huwever, the evidentiary burden shifts between the employer and the 
employee, and the employee bears the evidentiary burden at the outset to provide prima facie 
evidence of the automatically unfair reason. "143 
It has been stated that section 187 of the LRA imposes an evidentiary burden on an employee 
to adduce evidence sufficient to create a credible possibility that an automatically unfair 
dismissal occurred. 144 Following this an employer has to counter this by producing evidence 
to prove that the reason for the dismissal does not constitute an unfair dismissal as envisaged 
by the circumstances found in section 187. 
In light of this provision the evidentiary burden finally shifts back to the employee whereby 
the employee is to adduce evidence to counter those reasons proffered by the employer and 
accordingly show the employers reasons to be less than probable. There is in effect a 
141 J Brand (note 56 above) 219. 
142 (note 123 above) 
143lbid. 21. 
'"Per Davis AJA Kroukam v SA Air/ink (Pt.v) Ltd 2005 12 BLLR (LAC) 28. 
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rebuttable presumption that once discrimination is shown to be present by the employee it is 
assumed to be unfair and the employer has a duty to rebut, asserting that the discrimination 
was fair. 
The shift in the evidentiary burden wan-ants the party upon whom the evidentiary burden lies 
to adduce some evidence as rebuttal. A failure to rebut will lead to the prima facie evidence 
b . k l . 14s emg ta en as cone us1ve. 
145




THE STANDARD OF PROOF 
8.1 Introduction 
After having established which of the parties to a dispute bears the burden of adducing 
evidence, it is necessary to know of what degree or standard this proof should be. If a party is 
to successfully convince a presiding officer that their version is more probable than the 
opposition, in discharging the onus of proof the said party should put forward evidence of a 
certain prescribed standard. The standard of proof provides for how much proof is required of 
the party bearing the onus of proof. 
8.2 Criminal vs Civil Standard of Proof 
In criminal matters the standard of proof is that of 'beyond a reasonable doubt' whereby the 
State is required to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. The standard of 
proof in criminal matters is much stricter so as to ensure that only the truly guilty are 
convicted. Accordingly, proof beyond a reasonable doubt should convince a presiding officer, 
after a conspectus of all evidence that the accused is guilty of the offence as charged. 
In civil cases the 'burden of proof is discharged as a matter of probability'. 146 The said 
standard requires proof on a balance of probabilities. This is lower than the stricter standard 
applicable in criminal law. This standard presupposes that on a preponderance of 
probabilities one party's version is more likely than the other. 
It is important to note that there are instances where the inferences that can be drawn from 
both parties evidence are quite evenly balanced. It is in these situations where a set of facts 
suggest several inferences that a presiding officer is to select the most probable inference and 
if that favours the party bearing the onus of proof then he should be entitled to judgment. 147 
146PJ Schwikkard (note 27 above) 580. 
147
Cooper & another NNO v Merchant Trade Finance Ltd 2000 3 SA 1009 (SCA) 
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8.3 The Standard of Proof at Arbitrations 
In labour law and CCMA arbitrations the standard is also that of proof on a balance of 
probabilities. The Labour Court in the case of Avril Elizabeth Home for the .Mentally 
Handicapped v CCMA & Others 1J, 8 stated that it is trite law that the test to be utilised in 
determining whether an employee is guilty of the misconduct charges is on a 'balance of 
probability· on the evidence presented at arbitration'. 
The case of Fourie 's Poult1y Farm t/a Chubby Chicks v CCMA & Others' 49 quite succinctly 
states the test to be used in arbitrations as follows: 
"The proper test in arbitration proceedings is the civil one and if an arbitrator imports to the 
evidence before him the tesr applicable to criminal proceedings, namely that the discharge of 
the onus borne by employers must be determined beyond a reasonable doubt rather than on a 
balance of probabilities, a gross irregularity in the proceedings will have been 
perpetrated. "150 
It is imperative that the correct standard of proof be applied in arbitration proceedings. As can 
be seen above, a failure on the part of a commissioner to apply the correct standard of proof 
will result in the arbitration award being set aside. 
Proof on a balance of probabilities in essence means that the more probable version presented 
to an arbitrator supported by evidence will succeed in the dispute. Accordingly an employer, 
in misconduct proceedings will be required to prove that an employee committed the 
misconduct on a balance of probabilities. It is accepted that the standard of proof 
encompassed by civil law and necessarily arbitrations are of a lower threshold than that 
encompassed by criminal law. The test used in criminal law requires there to be no 
reasonable doubt based on evidence before a court. This implies that if proved that there is a 
possibility of doubt then the accused cannot be found guilty. In arbitrations however, the 
standard is lower and in order to prove something, what needs to be asserted in terms of the 
evidence is that the fact is more likely than not. It can therefore be inferred then that in order 
148(2006) 27ILJ1644 (LC) 1650. Emphasis added. 
149(2001) 10 BLLR 125 (LC) 
150 Ibid. 6. 
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to prove something at arbitration, it is only necessary to adduce evidence to the extent that a 
commissioner is able to anive at the conclusion that the said version is of a reasonable 
likelihood. The situation should be such that 'on preponderance, it is probable that a 
particular state of affairs existed'. 151 
The case of EarZv Bird Farms (Prv) Ltd v Mlambo 152is extremely useful in illustrating the 
implications of the two standards of proof in practice. The respondent employee was found 
on the company premises without reason or permission and in possession of company goods. 
The employee was dismissed at internal disciplinary proceedings and on appeal, the LAC 
quite correctly stated the following: 
'"The industrial court misdirected itself in imposing an onus of "absolute certainty". All the 
appellant was required to do was to prove on a balance of probabilities that the respondent 
had committed the misconduct complained about. "153 
The LAC found that on a balance of probabilities the employer had sufficiently proved the 
two charges and the dismissal was fair. This case illustrates that the less onerous standard of 
proof in civil law and arbitrations could have a very different result if tried in a criminal 
court. 
8.4 Conclusion 
To encapsulate the standard of proof as utilised in arbitrations, a chain of events as proved by 
evidence should enable an arbitrator to draw a plausible inference that the alleged state of 
affairs existed. 
If an arbitrator is unable to infer, on a balance of probabilities that the state of affairs existed 
then the party bearing the onus of proof must fail. Each case must be treated on its own 
merits and an arbitrator will require sufficient evidence to be adduced before a finding can be 
reached on a balance of probabilities. 
151 PJ Schwikkard (note 27 above) 580. 
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ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE IN ARBITRATIONS 
9 .1 Introduction 
While each party to a dispute adduces evidence to prove an allegation of fact, this serves only 
as a means of attempted proof and not all evidence adduced will achieve their object. 
Accordingly evidence once submitted, is subject to judicial scrutiny. A commissioner must 
still determine whether the evidence as presented is relevant, if it should be admitted, and if 
admissible, what weight to ascribe to it. Only once all evidence is presented at an arbitration 
hearing is a commissioner is in a position to determine whether, on conspectus of the 
evidence cumulatively, that a party has established their case on a balance of probabilities. 
9.2 The concept of Admissibility 
Some of the core responsibilities of an arbitrator are to identify the material issnes in dispute, 
to advise parties where the onus of proof lies and to clarify the legal framework. 154 A 
concomitant responsibility of dealing with the substantial merits of a dispute includes the 
duty to admit relevant evidence and exclude irrelevant evidence. 
Parties are required to present evidence and other probative material in order to prove or 
disprove the issues in dispute. The evidence, when tendered is merely an attempt to prove or 
disprove a fact in dispute. It is for the arbitrator to decide whether such means of proof should 
be included as evidence and thus be admitted. 
Admissibility refers to whether a particular item of evidence may be introduced at a hearing 
and taken into consideration by the arbitrator. 155 In essence it provides for what items may be 
accepted as evidence in a particular case and type of proceedings, in relation to the issues in 
dispute. This stage deals exclusively with whether the evidence may be admitted. If an item 
of evidence is admitted it does not mean that it is automatically true or is of any persnasive 
1540 Du Toit ... et al. (note 54 above) 128. 
155
T Cohen ... et al (note 104 above) 105. 
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value. The subsequent stage deals with the evaluation of evidence and whether the evidence 
is credible, reliable or probable; failing which it stands to be rejected. 
Arbitrators are required to observe various ptinciples of evidence including the onus of proof, 
standard of proof and the principle of relevance. However, the impact ofs 138 of the LRA is 
to lessen the strictness of the application of the law of evidence in arbitrations. To this effect, 
s 138 denotes that an arbitrator is to deal with evidence with the minimum of legal 
formalities. It is important to remember that arbitrations are not legal proceedings as in a 
court, neither is an arbitrator expected to conduct proceedings in a manner that mimics civil 
trial proceedings. Therefore, in order to observe the obligations in s 138 of the LRA, the 
traditional exclusionary rules relating to evidence must be relaxed in arbitrations so as to 
allow for flexibility in admitting evidence. 
9 .3 Relevance 
The admissibility of evidence is based upon the fundamental criterion of relevance. The 
general rule is that evidence will be admissible where it is relevant to the issues in dispute. 
Arbitrators are duty bound to draw the attention of parties as to the evidence they should lead 
in relation to the issues in dispute. These issues are generally narrowed at the commencement 
of proceedings. If the evidence is legally and logically relevant to the disputed issues, it 
serves as a good indication that an arbitrator should admit it. Facts will generally be relevant 
if through their existence proper inferences can be drawn to the existence of facts in issue. 156 
The courts have defined the term "relevant" in the context of evidence as being any two facts 
which are so related to each other, that if one is isolated the existence of the other is rendered 
improbable. 157 
The criterion of relevance can be applied to evidence in both a positive and negative manner. 
Therefore it is generally true that relevant evidence is admissible and irrelevant evidence will 
be inadmissible. 158 The rule regarding relevance found its way into South African law 
through the case of R v Trupedo 15\vhere Innes CJ stated the following: 
156
R v Mpanza 1915 AD 348. 352-353. 
157R v Katz 1946 AD 71. 78. 
158
DT Zeffert (note 75 above) 237. 
1591920 AD 58. 
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·The general rule is that all facts relevant to the issue in legal proceedings may be proved. Much 
of the law of evidence is concerned with exceptions ... But where its operation is not so excluded 
it must remain as the fundamental test of admissibility." 160 
The rule formulated in R v Trupedo 161 is clearly couched in a positive manner, applying an 
inclusionary aspect whereby all relevant evidence is admissible. In contrast, support for the 
negative application of the "relevance rule" can be found in section 2 of the Civil 
Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965 which reads as follows: 
'2 Evidence as to irrelevant matters 
No evidence as to any fact, matter or thing which is irrelevant or immaterial and cannot 
conduce to prove or disprove any point or fact in issue shall be admissible.' 
It is apparent from the above that irrelevant evidence or rather, evidence that is not relevant to 
facts in issue shall not be admissible. However, the circumstances of the dispute may warrant 
that evidence be admitted even though it is not relevant to the facts in issue. Such a scenario 
would arise where the evidence should be admitted as it affects the cogency of other 
evidence, for instance where the evidence has an impact on the credibility of a witness. 162 
This formulation of relevance must therefore be interpreted widely so as to include facts 
which have bearing not only on the admissibility of evidence, but also the cogency of other 
evidence. 
Of import to the concept of relevance is the notion of probative value. Evidence is said to 
have probative value where it is reliable and there is some indication that the evidence will 
assist the arbitrator in deciding the case. 163 Furthermore, the evidence should have the 
potential to provide some clarity on what actually happened where there is a dispute of fact 
without the need to embark on protracted investigations into collateral issues. 164 The reason 
for the rule is to limit evidence to that which is strictly necessary in resolving the issues in 
dispute, so as to save time and resources. The need for efficiency in the resolution of labour 
disputes in arbitrations is particularly pertinent and any consideration of irrelevant evidence 
would be contradictory to the purpose of s 138 of the LRA. 
160Ibid. 62. 
161 Ibid. 
162DT Zet1ert (note 75 above) 243. 
161T Cohen ... et al (note 104 above) 105. 
164 A Bellengere ... et al (note 24 above) 426. 
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The admissibility of evidence must be determined through the exercise of a certain measure 
of flexibility on the part of the arbitrator. There may be circumstances where a deviation from 
the rule may be warranted, for instance where a fair resolution cannot be reached without the 
consideration of evidence that is not strictly relevant to the issues. 165 
9.4 Excluding Relevant Evidence 
It is trite that only relevant evidence that is shown to rationally and logically assist the 
arbitrator will be admitted. However, where the evidence will unduly waste the arbitration's 
time for a dubious purpose or where its relevance is insignificant it must be excluded. The 
case of R v Trupedo 166 also provides that there will be instances where evidence may still be 
excluded notwithstanding its relevance to the issues. Certain relevant evidence may be 
inadmissible as it is privileged, was obtained in an improper manner or is likely to 
detrimentally affect the fair and speedy resolution of the dispute. 167 The instances where 
evidence will be inadmissible despite its relevance as alluded to in R v Trupedo168 above are 
encompassed by evidential exclusionary rules. Explanations about different forms of 
evidence and specific admissibility issues will be fully discussed in the chapters that follow. 
Arbitrators must be mindful that the context in which admissibility issues are assessed are 
arbitrations and not court proceedings. 169 An excessively legalistic and technical approach to 
the admission of evidence would not be conducive to dealing with a dispute with minimal 
legal formalities as outlined bys 138. The apparent practice amongst arbitrators has been to 
admit certain irrelevant evidence and leave it to the parties to argue what weight should be 
ascribed thereto. 170 
165J Brand (note 56 above) 206. 
106 (note 159 above) 
167T Cohen ... et al (note 104 above) 105. 
168 (note 159 above) 
169TCohen ... etal(note 104above) 106. 
170J Brand (note 56 above) 206. 
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CHAPTER 10 
THE EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE 
10.1 Introduction 
Whilst evidence has been admitted, it does not equate to the evidence constituting proof of 
any disputed fact or even that it is persuasive. The arbitrator may still find that certain 
admitted evidence may be untrue, unreliable or improbable. An arbitrator may also make 
findings that the admitted evidence is oflittle weight. 
Once all admissible evidence has been tendered by the parties, and the closing arguments 
have been delivered, the arbitrator has the task of assessing the impact of the evidence 
cumulatively in order to determine whether the adduced evidence sufficiently establishes or 
refutes the issues in dispute on a balance of probabilities. This entails evaluating which 
relevant facts have been proved, what inferences can be drawn from these facts and if the 
party bearing the onus has sufficiently proved all elements of its case and ultimately 
established a more probable version than the other party. 175 
10.2 How is Evidence Evaluated? 
The evaluation of evidence involves making findings of fact in relation to substantial and 
procedural issues following an assessment of the probabilities, credibility and reliability of 
witnesses and any applicable evidentiary rules. A proper conclusion can only be reached 
following a thorough analysis of the impact of the evidence cumulatively in relation to the 
issues in dispute. 
In the case of Sasol Mining v Commissioner Ngqeleni NO and others 176 the Labour Court 
provides that the proper approach when resolving disputes of fact is to make findings based 
on: the credibility of witnesses; the inherent probability or improbability of the version that is 
proffered by the witnesses; the reliability of their evidence; and lastly an assessment of the 
probabilities of the irreconcilable versions before· the arbitrator. The Court denoted the 
aforementioned factors as 'essential ingredients' in the evaluation of evidence, and further 
175 A Bellengere ... et al (note 24 above) 435. 
176 (2011) 32 ILJ723 (LC) 
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noted that it is only after the said assessment of evidence that a finding can be made as to 
whether a party has successfully discharged the burden of proof. Where an arbitrator fails to 
evaluate the evidence accordingly, he in essence fails to resolve the dispute and effectively 
denies the parties their right to a fair hearing. In this case the Court found that the arbitrator 
had made no proper attempt to analyse the oral evidence before him and had disregarded 
other material evidence. 177 
In the case of Network Field Marketing (Pzy) Ltd v lvfngezana NO and others 178 the Labour 
Court found that the arbitrator had barely evaluated the evidence and did not provide reasons 
as to why he relied solely on credibility findings when the balance of probabilities clearly 
favoured the employer. The arbitrator arrived at the conclusion that the employer's witnesses 
were unreliable on the basis of a minor contradiction between the witnesses which was 
insufficient to taint their evidence in entirety. 
With specific regard to the situation where evidence is led by a single witness, the general 
rule in terms of civil and criminal law has been to treat such evidence with caution. This is 
known as the cautionary rule. While courts have not rejected the applicability of this rule in 
terms of its application to arbitrations, parties may still rely on the evidence of a single 
witness to establish their case. 179 
Possible examples of failing to properly evaluate evidence include: drawing adverse 
inferences against the employer for reasons not put to its witnesses in cross-examination; 
failing to take into account; that a party, for no good reason, an available material supporting 
witness; failing to rely on or properly evaluate circumstantial evidence; and incorrectly taking 
into account alleged inconsistencies between the evidence given by certain witnesses at the 
disciplinary hearing and that given at the arbitration, in the absence of the inconsistencies 
being put to the witnesses. 180 
177lbid. 
178 (2011) 32ILJ1705 (LC) 
179
Northam Platinum Mines v Shai NO & Others (2012) 33 ILJ942 (LC). 
180 A Bellengere ... et al (note 24 above) 436. 
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10.3 Probabilities. Credibilitv and Reliabilitv 
The Labour Court has confirmed that the approach to be followed in evaluating evidence is to 
make findings of fact based on the factors of probabilities, reliability and credibility in 
relation to disputes of fact. 181 To this extent, the CCMA has attempted to codify this by 
incorporating it into the CCMA Practice and Procedure Manual as factors which an arbitrator 
must take into account in weighing up the evidence as a whole. 182 
In making a detennination of the probabilities, the arbitrator should ascertain the most 
probable version in relation to the disputed facts by considering both the probabilities and 
improbabilities of each version. An arbitrator must have regard to the type of evidence before 
him in weighing the probabilities. This relates to whether the evidence is hearsay or opinion 
evidence for example as this will have a significant impact on the weight of the evidence. 
In assessing the credibility of a witness, an arbitrator must assess the candour and demeanour 
of the witness when testifying. Relevant considerations include: whether the version averred 
by the witness is inherently probable; consistency with previous witness' versions; 
corroboration with other evidence and the manner in which the witness answered questions 
h •ct . 183 amongst ot er cons1 erat10ns. 
The credibility and reliability of a witness will also relate to any necessary motive to lie; the 
probabilities of aspects of the version as testified and that witnesses ability to accurately 
recall such occurrences. In determining the probability, reliability and credibility of evidence 
an arbitrator must not arrive at conclusions through considering each factor in isolation of 
each other. When evaluating evidence an arbitrator cannot make piecemeal evaluations or 
make determinations in a vacuum. An arbitrator must be aware of the cumulative effect of the 
factors in relation to the overall weight of evidence. 184 
181 Sasol }dining 1' Con1n1issioner 1Vgqeleni /v'O and others (note 176 above). 
182(note 63 above) 13.14. 
183T Cohen ... et al (note 104 above) 112. 
184Masi!ela v Leonard Dingler (Pty) ltd (2004) 25 ILJ 544 (LC) 29 
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CHAPTER 11 
THE ARBITRATION AWARD 
11.1 Introduction 
At the end of the arbitration the arbitrator must issue an award. This entails identifying the 
relevant legal issues and substantive law relevant to the dispute and evaluating the evidence 
to determine whether a factual basis has been established in respect of the relevant legal and 
substantive law issues and resolving disputes of fact. 
11.2 The Substantive Law 
Section 138(6) of the LRA provides that 'a commissioner must take into account any code of 
good practice issued by NED LAC or guidelines published by the Commission in accordance 
with the provisions of the Act ... ' 
The CCMA Guidelines on Misconduct Arbitrations provides assistance as to how arbitrators 
are to interpret and apply the law. An arbitrator is obliged to follow the guidelines to the 
extent that it advances an interpretation of the law, failing whieh good reasons must be 
proffered for the deviation. The Guidelines are aimed at promoting consistent decision 
making, but also assist parties in preparing their cases, and assessing whether arbitrators are 
thorough and rational in reaching the final decision. A further pivotal aspect of the Guidelines 
are to give effect to s 33(1) of the Constitution inter alia providing for the enshrined right to 
lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair administrative action. 
Commissioners are further obliged to interpret and apply the Labour Relations Act and other 
legislation. Judicial decisions of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal, 
Labour Appeal Court, High Court and the Labour Court are binding on the CCMA. The most 
recent decision on the interpretation of a provision handed down by the highest court is the 
interpretation to be followed by commissioners. Where there are inconsistencies an arbitrator 
is to consider these inconsistencies and provide reasons for the approach followed. 
Every decision made by an arbitrator must comply with the Constitutional imperative of 
section 33(1) of the Constitution which provides for the right to administrative action that is 
lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. In Sidumo & Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines 
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Ltd & Others 185 the Constitutional Court stated that the CCMA is an organ of state in terms 
of the Constitution and is subject to section 33 of the Constitution which requires the right to 
fair administrative action. 
11.3 Nature and effect of an Arbitration Award 
In order to pass muster the award must reflect that all issues in dispute have been resolved as 
well as provide a reply to the claim. The award should also outline findings on material facts 
and provide justifiable reasons correlating to the final decision. 186 The purpose of this is to 
formally denote that the commissioner in exercising his discretion, rationally and coherently 
reached a decision following a scrupulous consideration of all relevant material before him. 
The effect of an arbitration award issued by a commissioner is final and binding and is 
enforced in the same manner as if it were an order of the Labour Court. 187 Certification of the 
award by the relevant director of the CCMA is probably the most efficient manner of 
enforcing a CCMA award. A failure to comply with a CCMA arbitration award will 
constitute contempt and can be enforced by way of contempt proceedings instituted in the 
Labour Court. 188 The award is subject to review but parties cannot appeal the matter on its 
merits. 
11.4 Grounds for Review 
In accordance with their aim of speedy and cheap dispute resolution, the drafters of the LRA 
excluded the right of appeal from proceedings of the CCMA and bargaining councils and 
confined parties to the right to review. Section 145(1) of the LRA allows for any party 
alleging a defect in arbitration proceedings to make an application to the Labour Court for an 
order to set aside the award. The grounds for review are provided for ins 145(2) of the LRA 
as follows: 
'A defect referred to in subsection ( l ). means-
185 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC). 
186 Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO (1998) 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC); County Fair Foods (Pry) Ltd v CCMA & 
Others (1999) 11 BLLR 1117 (LAC) and Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO (2001) 9 BLLR 268 (LC). 
157 Section 143 (I) LRA 
158 Section 143(4) LRA 
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(a) that the commissioner-
(i) committed misconduct in relation to the duties of the commissioner as an 
arbitrator; 
(ii) committed a gross irregularity in the condnct of the arbitration proceedings; or 
(iii) exceeded the commissioner's powers; or 
(b) that an award has been improperly obtained.• 
Contrary to the intention of the drafters of the LRA, the interpretation of section 145 and the 
test for review has led to considerable judicial debate for many years, resulting in numerous 
conflicting judgments. Although this debate falls outside of the purview of this paper, it is 
necessary to peruse it because the issue of admissibility and the task of evaluation of 
evidence constitute a large part the arbitration process and thus potential ground for reviews. 
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Herholdt v Nedbank and others 189 
applied its mind to the aforementioned debate and found the following: 
I. The SCA in Rustenburg Platinum Mines v CCMA & others (2006) 27 JLJ 2076 (SCA) held 
that a reviewing court could, in addition to the requirements under section 145, review the 
award for reasonableness by examining the 'substantive merits' of the award to detennine 
whether the award was rationally connected to the reasons given by the arbitrator. Once it was 
found that the award was appreciably or significantly infected with bad reasons it fell to be set 
aside irrespective of whether it could otherwise be sustained on the material in the record. 
2. The Constitutional Court in Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum lv!ines Ltd & another 
(2007) 28 JLJ 2405 (CC)], however enunciated a different unreasonableness test, namely, 
whether the award was one that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach ('the Sidumo 
test').190 
3. On the Sidumo approach the reasoning of the arbitrator assumes less importance than it does 
on the SCA test, where a flaw in the reasoning/reasons results in the award being set aside. 191 
4. In the Sidumo test, the reasons are still considered to see whether the result can reasonably be 
reached by that route. If not, the court must still consider whether, apart from those reasons, 
the result is one a reasonable decision-maker could reach in light of the issues and the 
evidence. 192 The evidence must be scrutinised to detem1ine whether the outcome was 
reasonable. 193 
5. The Sidumo test will, however, justify setting aside an award if the decision is 'entirely 
disconnected with the evidence' or is 'unsupported by any evidence' and involves speculation 
b h . . 194 y t e comm1ss10ner. 
189[2013] 11 BLLR 1074 (SCA). 
;9o Ibid. 12. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Ibid. 13. 
194 Ibid. 
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The SCA then examined the 'latent irregularity' ground of review developed by the Labour 
Appeal Court in Herholdt. 195 
A latent irregularity, sometimes referred to as a process-related unreasonableness, is one 
arising from the failure by the arbitrator to take into account a material fact. It includes the 
converse situation of taking into account a materially irrelevant fact. 
According to the LAC, it is immaterial whether the result reached by the arbitrator is one that 
could reasonably be reached on the material before the arbitrator. The mere possibility of 
prejudice will suffice to warrant interference. 
The SCA in Herholdt rejected this test of the LAC and held that the test incorrectly lowers 
the threshold for review set out by the majority judgment in Sidumo. The SCA, however, 
stated that this does not mean that a latent irregularity, as Schreiner J originally used that term 
in the Goldfields Investments case, is not a gross irregularity within the meaning of 
sl45(2)(a)(ii). It is, but only in the limited sense where the decision-maker has undertaken the 
. d ak h . . h 196 wrong enqmry or un ert en t e enqmry m t e wrong manner. 
The SCA then examined the LAC's 'dialectical unreasonableness' ground for review. 
According to the LAC this review ground refers to the unreasonableness flowing from the 
process of reasoning adopted by the arbitrator, ie whether the decision 'is supported by 
argument and considerations recognised as valid, even if not conclusive'. 
The LAC held that proper consideration of all the relevant and material facts and issues is 
indispensable to a reasonable decision and if a decision-maker fails to take account of a 
relevant factor which he or she is bound to consider, the resulting decision will not be 
reasonable in a dialectical sense. It further held that there is no requirement that the 
commissioner must have deprived the aggrieved party of a fair trial by misconceiving the 
whole nature of [the] enquiry. The threshold for interference is lower than that: it being 
sufficient that the commissioner has failed to apply his mind to certain of the material facts or 
issues before him, with such having potential for prejudice and the possibility that the result 
may have been different. 
The SCA, however, held that these propositions were not a permissible development of the 
law and contrary to the Sidumo test. 
In summary, according to the SCA in Herholdt the proper test for review or the grounds for 
review of arbitration awards are as follows: 
1. The drafters of the LRA intended an extremely high standard for setting aside an award to 
support the overall aim of a speedy and inexpensive resolution of disputes arbitrated by the 
CCMA. 197 
195 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd (2012) 23 ILJ 1789 (LAC) 
196 Ibid. 21. 
197 Ibid. 9. 
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2. A review of a CCMA award is permissible if the defect in the proceedings falls within one of 
the grounds ins 145(2)(a). For a defect in the conduct of the proceedings to amount to a gross 
irregularity as contemplated by s 145(2)(a)(ii), the arbitrator must have misconceived the 
nature of the inquiry or arrived at an unreasonable result. 
3. A result will only be unreasonable if it is one that a reasonable arbitrator could not reach on 
all the material that was before the arbitrator. 
4. Material errors of fact, as well as the weight and relevance to be attached to particular facts, 
are not in and of themselves sufficient for an award to be set aside, but are only of any 
consequence if their effect is to render the outcome unreasonable. 
Following the SCA decision in Herho!dt, the LAC in Go/dfields Mining South Africa (Pty) Ltd v 
CCMA & others 198 held that where the arbitrator fails to have regard to material facts it is likely that 
he or she will fail to arrive at a reasonable decision. Where the arbitrator fails to follow proper process 
he or she may produce an unreasonable outcome. But, this is considered on the totality of the evidence 
not on a fragmented, piecemeal analysis. 199 The issue is whether the final decision of the arbitrator 
[the outcome] is in any event reasonable based on the totality of the material placed before the 
arbitrator.200 
11.5 Conclusion 
The arbitration award is fundamental as it formally denotes that the manner in which the 
arbitrator reasoned and how he arrived at the ultimate finding. In essence the questions to ask 
are these: (i) in terms of his or her duty to deal with the matter with the minimum of legal 
formalities, did the process that the arbitrator employed give the parties a full opportunity to 
have their say in respect of the dispute? (ii) did the arbitrator identity the dispute he was 
required to arbitrate9 (iii) did the arbitrator understand the nature of the dispute he or she was 
required to arbitrate? (iv) did he or she deal with the substantial merits of the dispute? and, in 
the final analysis, (v) based on the evidence, did the arbitrator arrive at a reasonable decision') 






SPECIFIC ADMISSIBILITY ISSUES IN RELATION TO CERTAIN TYPES OF 
EVIDENCE 
12.1 Introduction 
There are certain rules applicable to different types of evidence which serve to exclude the 
evidence for various reasons. In tenns ofrelevance being a fundamental factor in determining 
admissibility it stands to reason that irrelevant evidence must be excluded. Examples of 
irrelevant evidence include: character evidence, similar fact evidence and opinion evidence. 
Evidence that is accepted as being unreliable also stands to be excluded. Examples are 
hearsay evidence and evidence that is obtained under duress. Evidence also stands to be 
excluded where policy reasons dictate such exclusion, for instance where the evidence is 
privileged information or where it is obtained illegally or through some or other improper 
manner. 
There are exceptions to these exclusionary rules as applicable to the vanous forms of 
evidence as will be shown. Further, the CCMA is required in terms ofs 138 of the LRA to 
deal with disputes with the minimal legal formalities; this necessarily means that the 
aforementioned exclusionary rules cannot be applied strictly, if applied at all. 
12.2 Privileged Information 
Confidential communications between a pa1iy and their legal representative fall under the 
category of legal professional p1ivileged information. All communications subject to legal 
privilege need not be disclosed at arbitration proceedings unless agreed to by the relevant 
party. For the purposes of labour law, a legal representative includes a union representative 
and communications made in the context of seeking legal advice or in preparation for 
litigation need not be disclosed. In Le.vis and Baltimore Aircoil Co SA (Pty) Ltd201 the 
arbitrator ruled that the employer could not at arbitration call as a witness the employee who 
had represented the applicant employee at his disciplinary hearing. He found that attomey-
client privilege extended also to shop stewards and representatives at disciplinary hearings. 
201 (2013) ILJ751. 
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12.3 Paro! Evidence Rule 
In terms of this rule, parties to a written agreement, for example a collective agreement, are 
bound by what is written in the agreement. The document should speak for itself in terms of 
determining the intention of the parties. The parties may not seek to prove, contradict or 
change the written tenns of the agreement through oral evidence unless the agreement itself is 
unclear and ambiguous on the matter. However, where an employment relationship is 
disputed, arbitrators may permit ext1insic evidence and look behind an otherwise clear 
agreement to determine whether there is an employment relationship between the parties. The 
arbitrator may presume such a relationship exists where the employee proves certain facts 
listed in section 200A of the LRA unless the contrary is proved by the employer. Mpungose v 
Ridge Laundries CC 202 was one of the first test cases that looked beyond the written signed 
'independent contractor' agreements to determine real relationship. Cases like these lead 
to the enactment of section 200A in the LRA. 
Witnesses may not be asked to interpret a contract or be asked about the meaning of certain 
words in a contract unless certain words have a peculiar institutional or industry meaning. 
Interpretation is a matter oflaw and not fact. Accordingly, the arbitrator must decide a matter 
after listening to argument from both representatives.203 
12.4 Admissions and Confessions 
Generally admissions may be fonnal or informal. Formal admissions amount to an admission 
of adverse facts formally agreed to before the hearing. Such formal admissions become 
'common cause' and no evidence may be required to prove such facts as evidence. 
Informal admissions are admissions that have not been agreed to and are subject to scrutiny at 
hearings to ascertain whether they constitute proof of a disputed fact. Confessions are a form 
of informal admission where the maker admits to all the elements of, for example the 
misconduct charged.204 The stricter rules relating to admissions as applicable in criminal and 
civil law cannot be applied as strictly in arbitration hearings. 
202(1999) 20 ILJ 704 (CCMA). 
203 
KPMG Chartered Accountants (SA) v Sernrefin Ltd & Ano1her 2009 (4) SA 399 (SCA). 
'°' · T Cohen ... et al (note 104 above) 110. 
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The Labour Court in OK Bazaars (a division of Shoprite Checkers) v CCMA and 
Others205he1d that admissions and confessions in labour law need not be subject to the same 
stringent rules as those in criminal law. Where an employee voluntarily and in the absence of 
undue influence confesses to misconduct, the confession may be admitted and the employee 
may be found guilty of the misconduct if he or she has admitted all the elements of it. The 
employer does not have to confin11 the confession in a material respect or adduce evidence 
other than the confession to prove the misconduct. 
12.SDirect and Circumstantial Evidence 
Direct evidence proves a fact in issue directly and where relevant will be admissible. In 
contrast, circumstantial evidence proves a fact in issue indirectly. Circumstantial evidence is 
evidence of relevant facts which allow for disputed facts to be presumed through inferences 
which can be drawn from surrounding proved facts.206 
Circumstantial evidence relates to a combination of circumstances, which taken cumulatively 
allow for the formulation of a strong inference or conclusion relating to a dispute in issue. 
Circumstantial evidence will be admissible in arbitration hearings provided that the inference 
drawn from the evidence is consistent with proved facts and that the inference drawn is the 
1 'bl . "' '07 most p aus1 e m1erence.-
All that is required in arbitration hearings is that the arbitrator is able to draw an inference 
from the circumstantial evidence and that that inference is the most plausible inference that 
can be drawn. 
In Standard Bank Of SA v Mosime NO & another208 the employer's case was based on 
circumstantial evidence. The reviewing court found that the arbitrator should have found that 
the bank had made out a prima facie case which the employee was obliged to rebut. The 
circumstances led to the unavoidable inference that the employee was involved in the 
fraudulent transaction. By declining to draw that inference, the arbitrator had failed to 
'
05(2000) 21ILJ1188 (LC). 
206T Cohen ... et al (note 104 above) 112. 
207AA Onderlinge Assurasie Assosiasie Bpk 1· De Beer 1982 (2) SA 603 (A). 
208(2008) IO BLLR 1010 (LC). 
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discharge his duty to accept circumstantial evidence and had failed to draw obvious 




13. I Introduction 
Hearsay evidence is defined by the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 as 
"evidence, whether oral or in writing, the probative value of which depends upon the 
credibility of any person other than the person giving such evidence". This in essence means 
that the witness giving such evidence did not personally experience or observe such events. 
The basis of the evidence being led by the witness was received in some way from another 
person. 
Hearsay is inherently weak because the reliability of the evidence depends on the credibility 
of the source who is not present to be cross-examined regarding same.209 Its reliability is also 
open to question as it is dependent on the ability of the narrator to recollect the reported 
statements. Therefore, the general rule is that hearsay evidence is inadmissible. 
13.2 Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence 
The rule regarding the inadmissibility of hearsay evidence cannot be applied strictly in 
arbitration hearings as a result of s 138 of the LRA. Hearsay evidence will be admissible 
where the parties agree to its admission or where it would be in the interests of justice for the 
arbitrator to admit such evidence. The nature of arbitration hearings are not as formalistic and 
technical as traditional judicial proceedings and in accordance with s138 of the LRA, 
arbitrators should more readily exercise a discretion in favour of admitting hearsay evidence. 
Various factors will influence the admission of hearsay evidence including the reason why 
the originator of the evidence cannot be brought, the nature and purpose of the evidence 
being brought and the value of the evidence in relation to the overall jigsaw of evidence. The 
hearsay evidence should relate to the issues in dispute and should have the ability to 
corroborate other evidence. Arbitrators should be conscious of the possibility that hearsay 
evidence may be confirmed or corroborated through evidence that may be presented later on 
in the hearing. 
209PJ Schwikkard (note 27 above) 270. 
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The case of Naraindath v CC111A and Others210noted that reliance by an arbitrator on hearsay 
evidence where the arbitrator is satisfied that such reliance is properly grounded and 
procedurally logical, then it will not constitute a reviewable inegularity. 
Medical rep011s and ce11ificates are commonly used by employees as evidence in disputes. 
Such reports will generally be admissible as the employee as the patient can attest to the 
authenticity and conectness of the certificate or report. Where the technical contents of such 
report, namely those relating to medical issues outside the knowledge of the employee 
patient, become the subject of a dispute, the contents will amount to hearsay evidence in the 
absence of a doctor's testimony. However, arbitrators are not bound by the strict rules of 
evidence and the Labour Appeal Court has held that medical certificates can be taken into 
account without being accompanied by a doctor's testimony where it is conoborated by other 
reliable evidence.211 
13.3 Conclusion 
The discretion to exclude hearsay evidence at arbitration hearings should be exercised with 
caution by arbitrators. What is waJTanted is an assessment of the reliability of the hearsay 
evidence and its relevance to the overall mosaic of evidence, following which a determination 
can be made as to the weight to give to the evidence. An arbitrator should ascertain objective 
aspects of hearsay evidence that do not require direct testimony. Such hearsay evidence can 
be given significant weight. Hearsay evidence that is dependent on the conoboration of other 
evidence or that can only be tested through cross-examination must be given diminished 
weight, or excluded altogether. 
210(note 25 above). 
211
Le Monde Luggage CC,,, Commissioner f)unn and Others (note 55 above). 
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CHAPTER 14 
SIMILAR FACT EVIDENCE 
14.1 Introduction 
Similar fact evidence is evidence that attempts to show a likelihood of guilt of a party by 
virtue of past misconduct of a similar nature. Such evidence is led with the view that an 
inference should be drawn that by virtue of former related misconduct, the party accused of 
misconduct has committed the same misconduct again. Similar fact evidence is generally 
irrelevant and is therefore inadmissible. Further reason for the exclusion of similar fact 
evidence is that a person should be held liable for misconduct based on reasons direct! y 
related to the matter in dispute. The inclusion of any other past misconduct will be regarded 
as unfairly prejudicial. 
14.2 Admissibility of Similar Fact Evidence 
There is however an exception to the exclusionary rule against similar fact evidence. Similar 
fact evidence may be relevant and admissible where it used to identify a culprit and 
establishes a pattern of behaviour (modus operandi) in strikingly similar previous offences to 
that alleged in the present matter.212 
Some of the problems associated with similar fact evidence is that the accused party has to 
now defend previous acts as well as the current allegation. Another significant problem is that 
the introduction of similar fact evidence raises collateral issues which have the impact of 
being time consuming. Similar fact evidence should only be admitted by arbitrators where the 
probative value of the evidence in relation to material facts in issue are of greater value than 
the potential prejudice it could cause. 
In Gaga v Anglo Platinum Ltd213 the employer sought to use similar fact evidence of the 
employee's earlier conduct to prove that the employee had in fact sexually harassed the latest 
complainant. While, the commissioner at the arbitration hearing failed to admit such 
evidence, the Labour Appeal Court held that the commissioner's exclusion of the similar fact 
evidence constituted a reviewable irregularity. The LAC further found that the similar fact 
Jj') . 
· · CCMA Practice and Procedure Manual (note 63 above) 13.11.2 
213 (2012) 33 ILJ329 (LAC) 
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evidence would not constitute a time wasting mqmry where it is led to show a modus 
operandi, which in the circumstances was a pattern of sexual harassment. 
The LAC decision in Gag1z2' 4 in dealing with similar fact evidence has effectively lowered 
the threshold for the admission of unfairly prejudicial material at arbitration hearings. 215 
Whiles 138 of the LRA provides for commissioners to conduct proceedings with the minimal 
of legal formalities it does not mean that evidential safeguards relating to the exclusion of 
similar fact evidence can be disregarded. 
14.3 Conclusion 
The introduction of similar fact evidence into arbitration hearings brings with it complexities 
which will inevitably hamper the speed and cost efficiency of arbitrations conducted under 
the auspices of the CCMA. Allowing similar fact evidence that is still to be proved will 
complicate arbitration hearings and will further give rise to reviewable irregularities; 
nullifying the object efficient dispute resolution. Therefore, save for similar fact evidence that 
is directly relevant to factual issues in dispute- the many policy reasons warrant the exclusion 
of vague similar fact evidence. 
214 Ibid. 





Generally, a witness may only depose to the facts that he or she directly observed through the 
use of the five senses. Where a witness makes assertions over and above his or her 
observations, the result is that the witness is drawing inferences or conclusions based on these 
observations and inevitably giving an opinion. It is not for a witness to formulate opinions 
and draw inferences. Generally a witness is not qualified to make such inferences and is 
inadmissible as it constitutes irrelevant testimony. 
It is the function of the arbitrator to draw inferences and arrive at conclusions from proved 
facts presented by witnesses. A witness will essentially usurp the function of an arbitrator 
where he or she expresses an opinion based on observations. 
15 .2 Admissibility of Opinion Evidence 
As noted earlier, it is the duty of the arbitrator to draw inferences from the facts laid before 
him. However, in certain instances an arbitrator may permit the opinion evidence of both an 
expert and/or lay person. Sometimes an arbitrator is not qualified to form an opinion or draw 
inferences and he or she may choose to rely on the opinion of an expert witness who is better 
suited to drawing such inferences. It is necessary to first establish that a witness is in fact an 
expert. 216 An expert witness should be qualified or possess expertise in the form of skill, 
knowledge and experience and is accordingly able to draw better inferences than an arbitrator 
on certain facts. In particular when it comes to the medical evaluation of a person's health, 
our courts have noted that a doctor's expert opinion should be admissible.217 
A non-expert witness will be permitted to give opinion evidence where he is only able to 
express himself meaningfully through the making of an inference, or where he is in a better 
position than the arbitrator to make an inference. A lay witness in these circumstances will 
116 
CCMA Practice and Procedure Manual (note 63 above) 13.5.8 
217Sipho Emmanuel Mgobhozi v Rajah Naidoo (2006) 27 ILJ786 (LAC). 
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express an opinion based on general human experience and knowledge.218 Examples of such 
opinion evidence include evidence based on speed, age, value and intoxication.219 
Jn cases of intoxication, evidence need not be of a technical or medical nature in order to be 
admissible.no The testimony of a lay witness as to the intoxication of an accused employee in 
the absence of a satisfactory explanation by that employee will constitute a more probable 
. ,,, 
vers10n on the part of the employer.·· 
Arbitrations do not constitute civil proceedings in terms of s42 of the Civil Proceedings 
Evidence Act 25 of 1965. Accordingly, the Hollington Rule does not apply to arbitrations and 
as a result an arbitrator may take into account the findings and observations of a court of law 
as rebuttable, prima facie evidence.222 
15.2.1 Polygraph Evidence 
Polygraph evidence as a lie detector test amounts to opinion evidence which attempts to 
indicate the guilt or otherwise of an accused employee. Once again, it is the duty of the 
arbitrator to determine through the facts whether a party has been evasive on certain points. 
This form of opinion evidence is particularly controversial as the scientific validity and 
reliability of lie detector tests have not been accepted by our courts or the Health 
Professionals Council of South Africa. 223 At best it provides an indication that one has a 
strong emotional response to a question, and by no means constitutes proof that the employee 
lied. Therefore even if admitted, polygraph evidence can generally only serve as 
corroboratory of other evidence against an employee. 224 The Labour Courts, however, have 
held that the results of a polygraph test may be taken into account in assessing the credibility 
of a witness and in assessing the probabilities.225 
) JS · A Bellengere ... et al (note 24 above) 429. 
'.']9 -· J Brand (note )6 above) 216. 
220
S v Edley! 970 (2) SA 223 (N) notes that the more manifest the physical manifestations of intoxication are as 
averred by a reliable and credible lay witness then the more readily medical and technical evidence can be 
dispensed with. 
221
Exactics- Pet (Pl}) Ltd v Patelia NO and others (2006) 6 BLLR 551 (LC). 
222Nel ,. Law Society; Cape of Good Hope 2010 (6) SA 263 (ECG). 
223TCohen ... etal(note 104above) 105. 
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CHAPTER 16 
IMPROPERLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE 
16.1 Introduction 
The notion of improperly obtained evidence encompasses evidence that was obtained 
illegally, unlawfully, contrary to any workplace policy regulating such gathering of evidence 
and evidence that constitutes an improper infringement of a person's right to privacy and 
dignity. Evidence must not be obtained under duress and an accused person cannot be obliged 
to give evidence that is self-incriminating.226 
16.2 Admissibility of Improperly Obtained Evidence 
Tribunals in civil matters have a discretion to exclude evidence that has been obtained in an 
improper manner.227 In exercising this discretion, the following considerations must be taken 
into account: 
• If there were any lawful means of obtaining the evidence; 
• If justice could be achieved through the use of ordinary measures; 
• If there was a deliberate violation of the constitutional rights of an employee.228 
It is important to note that arbitrations do not constitute civil proceedings and arbitrators are 
not expected to conduct arbitration hearings as such. In this regard section 138 of the Labour 
Relations Act provides for the relaxation of the strict admissibility rules relating to evidence 
as applicable in courts. Improperly obtained evidence may have a significant impact on an 
employee's rights to privacy and dignity. An arbitrator is accordingly expected to balance the 
rights of an employer to protect its business interests and an employee's rights to privacy and 
dignity. 
16.2.1 Interception of Communications 
The Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provisions of Communications 
Related Information Act 70 of 2002 (RICA) subject to certain exceptions, prohibits the 
intentional interception and monitoring of communications. The Act primarily prohibits a 
226
Goosen v Caroline ·s Frozen Yoghur! Parlour (Pl}) Ltd & Another(!) (1995) 16 ILJ396 (JC). 
227Lotter 1· Ar/ow and another 2002 (6) SA 60 (T) 
228Ibid. 
62 
third party intercepting or monitoring communications and does not apply where one is a 
participant to communications and records or divulges such information.229 Interception by a 
third party is pen11itted with the consent of a party to such communications or where the 
communications are in a public domain, including unrestricted access to social networks.no 
Section 6 of RICA deals specifically with the interception and monitoring of an employee's 
communications made at the workplace using an employer's telecommunication systems. An 
employer will be permitted to intercept the communications of employees' provided: 
• the communications were made using the employers' telecommunication systems which were 
provided for use wholly or partly in connection with the business of the employer; 
• employees were made aware in advance that their communications made through the use of 
the employer's telecommunication systems may be intercepted and monitored; 
• interception is not done at random and without proper reason; 
• the systems controller consents to such interception each time;m 
• the purpose for such interception must be to establish the existence of facts relevant to the 
business.232 
In addition to the above, evidence obtained through the interception of an employee's 
communications will be admissible where it can be shown that there were no less drastic 
means of detection available. 
In Moonsamy v The Mailhouse233the arbitrator stated that telephone conversations are a 
'very private affair'. The employer must show that there are compelling reasons within the 
context of business that necessitate that the contents of those conversations are disclosed. 
He drew the line at continual tapping of an employee's business telephone and found that 
the employer could have and had, in fact, acquired evidence against Moonsamy by less 
intrusive means. 
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-- Dauthl Brown and Weirs Cash and Carn (2002) 8 BA.LR 837 (CCMA). 
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Sedick & Ano1her and Krisray (Pty) Lid (2011) 32 IL! 752 (CCMA). In considering the application of RICA, 
the comn1issioner in this case found that the Internet and therefore Facebook \.vas in the public do1nain. Where a 
party fails to use their privacy options, the right to privacy and protections of RICA fall away. 
231 
Systems controller is defined as a natural person in the case of private bodies; a partner in a partnership and a 
chief executive officer (or persons duly authorized thereby) in the case of juristic persons. 
''.' Section 6 RICA. Confirmed in Sugreen 1· Standard Bank ofSolllh Aji·ica (2002) 23 IL! 1319 (CCMA). 
2 '·'(1999) 20 IL! 464 (CCMA). 
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In Sugreen v Standard Bank of SA 134the employer had obtained a tape recording of a 
conversation between one of its managers and a service provider, which revealed a bribe. 
The service provider made the tape recording and gave it to the employer. The arbitrator 
differentiated this case from Moonsamy v The A1ailhouse on the basis that there were few 
other methods by which the evidence could have been acquired, that the recording was 
made during business hours and using the employer's telephone. In any event, it was a 
case of 'participant monitoring', which is permitted by RICA. 
In Bamford and Others v Energiser (SA) Limited,235 the arbitrator sanctioned the collection 
and storage of email messages from employees' private mailboxes on the basis that the 
content of the messages (crude jokes and pornographic material) could not be construed as 
private. Moreover, when the company conducted an audit of its system when technical 
problems arose through overloading, it was seeking to establish the existence of facts 
indicating the root of the technical problem. It needed to secure the system's effective 
operation and, in the process, discovered improper use of the system, which amounted to 
misconduct. 
16.2.2 Monitoring and Searches 
Save for change-rooms and toilets an employer is permitted to monitor its premises and 
operational areas through camera surveillance. An employer is entitled to protect its property 
and business through the use of video and camera surveillance. There can be no expectation 
of absolute privacy in the workplace and evidence obtained in this manner is admissible. 
Where evidence is obtained following a search it will be admissible where an employee has 
contractually agreed to undergo searches. Evidence obtained as a result of a search is 
admissible where an employer has reasonable grounds to conduct the search of an 
employee's person or workstation. It is also important in the context of body searches that 
such search was conducted in a decent manner and that there were no less drastic means of 
detection. 
23'{2002) 23 ILJ 1349 (CCMA). 
235 [2001] 12 BALR 1251 (P) 
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I 6.2.3 Entrapment 
Entrapment occurs where an agent or employee of the employer cooperates with an employee 
in the commission of an offence. Evidence obtained as a result of entrapment will be 
admissible where the employer reasonably suspected the employee of misconduct. Evidence 
that is obtained in this manner will be inadmissible where it provides more than an 
opportunity for an employee to commit an offence. Anything beyond providing an 
opportunity would amount to enticement, and it would be contrary to public policy to permit 
such evidence. 
In Cape Town City Council v SAi\!JWU and Others, 236 the Court found that the evidence 
obtained in the trap in casu (what the employees did and said during the trap and the 
information uncovered by the agent) was inadmissible because there was no proper pre-
existing suspicion about the employees. In addition, the agent had exceeded the bounds set 
by section 252A of the Criminal Procedure Act by actively encouraging and unduly 
inducing the employees to commit the offence. The onus rests on the employer to show 
that the trapping was fairly conducted. 237 
16.3 Conclusion 
The rules regulating the admissibility of improperly obtained evidence in courts cannot be 
adhered to strictly in arbitrations by virtue of s 138 of the LRA. Arbitrators must be 
conscious of employees' rights to fair labour practices in exercising the discretion to exclude 
illegally and improperly obtained evidence. 
Section 6 of RICA only permits the interception and monitoring of an employee's 
communications under certain circumstances, affording some protection to the rights of both 
the employee and employer. It is therefore necessary for arbitrator's to balance the rights and 
interests of the employee as well as that of the employer in deciding to admit or exclude 
evidence that was obtained in an improper manner. 





The purpose of this research paper was to examine arbitrations conducted in terms of the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, under the auspices of the CCMA and bargaining councils. 
In particular, the specific statutory powers including the test for review and chiefly the impact 
of section 138 of the LRA on the conduct of proceedings. 
The concept of 'evidence' in civil law and labour law was discussed along with the different 
types of evidence and the presentation thereof in arbitrations. Related evidential concepts of 
the onus of proof, the evidentiary burden and the standard of proof were discussed in detail 
comparing the criminal, civil and labour law positions. 
The central focus of this paper was on the actual process of adducing evidence in arbitrations, 
the powers and duties of arbitrators in conducting these proceedings and how the evidence 
was ultimately evaluated. The statutory provisions of the LRA, particularly s 138 was shown 
to have a significant impact on the manner in which arbitrator's exercised their powers in the 
conduct of proceedings. Having regard to the Legislature's purpose in creating the CCMA 
and necessarily arbitrations, the object of quick, efficient dispute resolution becomes obvious. 
Wbile s 138 grants arbitrators the discretion to conduct proceedings in a manner they deem 
fit, this does not mean arbitrators have carte blanche as to the manner in which proceedings 
are conducted. The ensuing award following an arbitration must reflect that all relevant issues 
were taken into account; that the arbitrator applied his mind to the evidence before him and 
ultimately that the outcome is fair. 
What came to the fore through this research was the constant reminder that arbitration 
proceedings are not the same as proceedings conducted in a court. Wbile there are certain 
formalities and facets of the conduct of arbitration proceedings that resemble court 
proceedings, arbitrators are not expected to mimic legal proceedings as if they were in a 
court. The cumulative effect of this principle together with the objectives of the LRA and the 
provisions of s 138 warrant a relaxation of the strict rules of evidence as applicable in a court. 
To this effect, the latter chapters of this paper focused on specific critical types of evidence. It 
was shown through the analysis of case law and academic commentary that the strict 
exclusionary rules of evidence cannot be applied in arbitration hearings. For arbitrators to 
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conduct hearings efficiently, it would be beneficial for them to possess some form of 
procedural understanding of the law of evidence so as to detennine when items of evidence 
should be admitted despite not being strictly relevant, and if so what weight to ascribe to it. A 
sound understanding of the law of evidence and its associated procedures would go a long 
way in adhering to the objects of arbitration- circumventing the strict rules of evidence, 
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